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
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Army—Civil Administration Interaction*

BINAYA RANJAN MISHRA, IAS

"The jawan serving in remote area is dependent on the civil administration for the just and prompt redressal of grievances affecting the security of his family and property. In the recent past there has been a substantial erosion in this sphere of interaction between the army and the civil services. Analyse measures for restoring the credibility of the civil administration in this sphere in the perception of the jawan".

INTRODUCTION

THE Army occupies an eminently strategic position in a modern nation-state. And this is especially true in case of a transitional society like India—a society traversing from tradition to modernity through a complex and skewed social process. Here, the Army performs a dual task: it protects and upholds the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national independence, and also maintains internal unity by containing and crushing the fissiparous forces from within. Hence, a good, strong, efficient and warwinning army is a prime requisite of any modern state.

An ideal Army has certain deterministic properties which can be analysed along two dimensions : physical, and phycho-moral. Among the psysical determinants are an optimum size depending on the area and location of the State, proper organisation and imaginative leadership, rigorous and comprehensive training, modern intelligence network and advanced weapons systems of the latest generation. And the psycho-moral factors converge on the sole determinant: the "soul" of the Army, the indomitable spirit of oneness, the high morale coupled with brimming enthusiasm to sacrifice life at the altar of national security. Quite often, the phycho-moral determinant assumes primacy over the physical attributes. High morale is a function of emotional security. And the nation obtains an ideal Army only when it guarantees emotional security to all its jawans—security of family and property in the domestic front; and security in the professional domain, (both during and after the career in the Army).

* Awarded Army Trophy and Gold Medal for the Essay Competition 1984.

From this perspective, the civil service plays a crucially significant role in enthusing a patriotic fervour in the Army. It endeavours to promote the security of jawan's family and property, and to guarantee a secured future after his successful service in the Army. But has it really been sincere to its duties and successful in the attainment of its objective? If yes, to what extent and why? And if no, what did go wrong and where? These are a few ponderous questions which are attempted to be answered in this paper.

Keeping this in view, the paper comprises four sections. Section I delineates the domain of dependence of the jawan on the civil administration, and examines some issue-areas, like the security of family and of property, security of profession for the ex-servicemen, and rehabilitation of the war victims and widows. Section II analysis the recent erosion in the Army-Civil Service interaction, examines a few selected indicators of the trend, and attempts at a causal analysis of the same. Some measures are suggested for restoration of the credibility of the civil administration from the perception of a jawan which form the crux of Section III. And the concluding section enumerates a few generalisations and ends up with a prognosis for the future.

The paper does not aspire to be over-ambitious in its scope due to several inherent situational and methodological constraints. As a non-army personnel, it is difficult to comprehend the perceptions of a jawan serving in remote areas. Nor is the author a well-groomed bureaucrat in the real sense of the term; and a month-old stint in the foundational course does not proffer much insight into the problems of a jawan from the administration's point of view. And above all, the dismal lack of literature on the subject obviates the endeavour to present a data-based comprehensive study of the problem. Therefore, the present study is primarily based on the author's discussions with a few senior army officials and bureaucrats, and on his first-hand impressions about the conditions of a few families of jawans in the Puri District of Orissa.

Bureaucracy mediates between the government and the people. It provides informational inputs and feed-backs to the former, and conveys the decisional outputs to the latter. Thus, it significantly contributes to the formulation and implementation of public policies. The general populace as a whole greatly depends on the bureaucracy for attainment of their needs and objectives, and redressal of grievances. And the jawan is an integral and important part of the populace. Therefore, he depends to a very great extent on the civil administration for the just and prompt redressal of grievances. The

present section attempts to measure this degree of dependence in the following four issue-areas: security of family, security of property, security of post-army career for ex-servicemen, and security of the war victims.

A. SECURITY OF THE FAMILY

Due to the processes of industrialisation, urbanisation and modernisation, the Indian social system witnesses an irreversible and unilinear trend towards the nuclearisation of joint families. Joint families are collapsing, and with them the inherent advantages accruing therein are also being lost. Hence, a jawan with a nuclear family has a greater security problem than the one with a joint family.

Once the protective umbrella of joint family is no more available, the condition of the wife-mother element becomes precarious in a typical nuclear family. The children look to their mother for physical, financial and emotional support, while the mother is uncared for as the jawan is away on his duty. Bereft of emotional security, she has to interact with various people for the maintenance of her family. But people in a predominantly agrarian, feudal society cannot reconcile to the relative independence of a young woman and smell infidelity. Some may start pestering her, making advances as and when the opportunity comes; some may spread rumours and scandals maligning her public image; and some may still try to establish illicit relationship with her. Cornered by a multitude of forces and temptations, some give in, and the jawan's nuclear family loses the mother-wife element. And in those cases where she resists such overtures, she is subjected to unnecessary and, sometimes, inhuman harassment in various forms. Threats ranging from physical harm to mental torture come from the village touts, jealous neighbours, and other anti-social elements, and her life becomes miserable.

Besides, there may be occasions when the jawan's family living in a rented accommodation is forcibly evicted on any flimsy ground, including that of alleged non-payment of rent. The landlord does not wait for the jawan's arrival and drives her out into the streets. Sometimes also, the family is forced to vacate its own legal residence under intimidation or blackmail. And when the jawan returns, he finds his family on the roads.

Moreover, in areas where law and order situations are generally precarious, jawan's family suffers a lot. If he belongs to a minority community, in cases of communal riots it is his family which bears

the burnt to a large extent. Besides, his family is made a victim of casteism if he does not belong to the dominant caste group of the locality. Also in areas where the Army had been deployed to contain and crush violence, the aggrieved hoodlums wreck their vengeance, on the jawan's family (because of his identification with the Army interests) once the military is removed from the scene. And sometimes, the police, the supposed guardian of public security, also contributes its mite to the harrassment and humiliation of the jawan's family. It may register fabricated complaints and involve the family in a series of litigations.

And the problem of family security becomes all the more crucial in dacoit-infested areas, like the Behind District of Madhya Pradesh. The dacoit gangs kidnap the member(s) of a family and demand ransom. And they are so powerful that there have been instances of payment of ransom with the full knowledge of the local police. Therefore, in a jawan's family, where father-husband element is far away from home, the security problem assumes a great proportion; and consequently, the degree of dependence of the jawan's family on the civil administration increases manifold.

B. SECURITY OF PROPERTY

Security of property is the second issue-area in the domain of dependence of the jawan on the civil administration. Here, property basically refers to the most elementary form of rural property, i.e. land. And in pursuit of its goal of eradicating rural poverty, the Government has undertaken various land reform measures which have affected the rural propertied classes in varying degrees.

"Land to the landless" has been a major theme of land reform measures. Almost all State Governments have included the landless service personnel as one of the priority categories for land allotment. For example, the Revenue Book Circular (RBC) in Madhya Pradesh accords priority to a landless jawan over the landless rural poor, except the SCs and STs. But the procedural requirement is cumbersome. Before handing over the "Patta" (the lease document), the Government invites objections, if any, from the people. And here lies the crux of the problem. A large number of objections get filed because of several reasons. Firstly, there is an envy angle to the issue, i.e. some envious people question the rationale of treating the jawan as a priority category when he has already been

employed by the Government. Secondly, because of village groupism and numerous alignments, the rival groups invariably file complaints. And lastly, the process of filing complaints involves an application with a Court fee of Rs. 2/- only, which is nothing when compared to the degree of tension and trouble it brings to the prospective owner.

Also, under the distribution of ceiling surplus land, the jawan, as a beneficiary, may be allotted such land on which the title of ownership is in dispute. And the disputing party is always out to harass the jawan's family in his absence. It may resort to land-grabbing, or not allowing to begin cultivation, or forcible harvesting of the crop, as the case may be. And particularly in case of encroachment, the possessor, if in adverse possession for atleast 12 years, fructifies his title to the land. So some unscrupulous persons, in absence of the jawan, may encroach upon his land and legitimise the title subsequently. All these invariably drag the jawan to the court of law where long-drawn legal battles are fought and in which he is the worst sufferer. Again the jawan may also be allotted barren and unproductive land which is more a liability than an asset. Thus, due to administrative apathy and negligence, the jawan becomes a hapless victim of the so-called "benevolence" of the Government.

Land consolidation measures, when undertaken in his absence, may also pose problems for the jawan. On the one hand, it enables the vested interests to lay claims over his land. And on the other, they try to grab his fertile land in exchange for their barren or less productive land and get it legitimised under the provisions of consolidation of land holding laws. Hence, the honest jawan gets cheated in the process.

Moreover, the jawan may confront various problems in so far as tenancy reforms are concerned. In pursuit of the goal of "Land to the tiller", the Government has abolished tenancy cultivation. However, the jawans are one of the few categories which have been permitted to employ tenants. For example, Sec-5 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1974 (amended) exempts jawans from tenancy reforms. But that does not end the worries. The tenant usually plays mischief with the jawan. He may not pay his dues regularly, or in extreme cases he may not even give possession of the land to its rightful owner, which amounts to adverse possession. And the problem gets complicated when harijan tenants are involved, who may exert political pressure on the settlement officer to decide the case in their favour. Or else, taking advantage of the jawan's absence, the tiller may also

initiate fabricated revenue litigations dragging him to the court when he is expected to stay away on his duty.

Again, in cases of Government's acquisition of the jawan's land for various public purposes, such as digging of a canal or construction of road, etc., the jawan is entitled to just compensation from the Government. But the compensation has to be disbursed promptly and directly to the jawan so as to save him from unintended hardship.

All these problems, in fact, point to the degree of dependence of the jawan on civil administration in guaranteeing the security of his property against numerous combinations of vested interests.

C. SECURITY OF PROFESSION

The jawan serving in remote areas in inclement conditions does need a firm guarantee on the security of his career or profession, both within and outside the Army. While within the Army, it is the responsibility of the Commanding Officer to guarantee such security, subject to relevant regulations prevalent therein. But the jawan has to depend on the civil administration for securing a profitable vocation immediately after successful completion of his tenure in the Army.

Indeed, the question of professional security weighs heavily in the jawan's mind. He enters the "colour service" for a duration of 15 years, at a young age of 17 or 18. So by 32 or 33 years, he becomes jobless, and is thrown out on the roads looking for a new career. This sense of professional insecurity adversely affects the morale of the jawan. Hence, the Government has undertaken various programmes and projects to provide the ex-servicemen with a second career and to re-settle them in Government and private services, vocational and technical trades, transport services etc. These include :

- (i) reservations for them in Grade-C and D posts in Central Government by 10% and 20% respectively;
- (ii) providing employment by enrolling them in ecological task forces in hilly areas of U.I., Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir, and in a peace-keeping force in Bihar;
- (iii) preparing them for self-employment by giving them preference in the allotment of factory plots, industrial and shopping centres, liberal credits, and
- (iv) training them in different professions; industrial, agricultural skills, animal-husbandary, teaching and social work. The PEXEM (Preparing Ex-Servicemen for self-Employment) introduced on the 1st April, 1983 on a pilot basis in one district each

in Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu is a case in point. Here, they will be given necessary training and guidance and other assistance to set up their self-employment ventures in rural areas.

And in all these schemes, the civil administration plays a strategic role for their implementation. From allotment of industrial sheds and factory plots, and providing technical training to the arrangement of liberal credits and implementation of specific employment generating schemes, the civil administration monitors everything. Thus, the jawan has to depend on it to a considerable extent so as to secure a profitable second career for his livelihood.

D. SECURITY OF THE WAR VICTIMS

What bothers a jawan much more than his professional security is his concern for his rehabilitation in case he is disabled, or that of his family in the event of his death while on duty. Given the nature of his sacred duty which demands eternal preparedness to sacrifice his life, his mind is often bogged down with this insecurity syndrome. Hence, the Government—both Central and State—has undertaken certain measures for the rehabilitation of the bereaved families, particularly widows, the disabled, and their dependants. These include:

- (i) creation of a special organisation in the Ministry of Defence to co-ordinate action on various schemes;
- (ii) liberal pension concessions for widows and families of the killed, and the disabled;
- (iii) full educational costs by Central Government upto the first Degree to the dependants of all the personnel of military and para-military forces killed or permanently disabled in war;
- (iv) priority in employment under the Central Government and Public Undertakings with relaxations in age, educational qualifications and medical standards;
- (v) jobs for two members from the family of the servicemen killed in action in Grade-C and D under the Ministry of Defence, without registration at the employment exchange; and
- (vi) various State Government schemes, like liberal cash grants, ex-gratia allotment of land for agricultural purposes and residential plots on concessional rates etc.

And the local administration plays an important role in the implementation of various State Government Schemes for the rehabilitation of the war victims. Not much has been done by the States

in this respect. And when they do increase the reach and content of their programmes for the war victims, the dependence of the jawan on the civil administration will increase proportionately.

These problem-areas, thus, constitute the broad contours of the domain of dependence of jawan on the civil administration.

II

The Army-Civil Service interaction constitutes a vital relationship pattern in any modern society. The domain of dependence of the Army on the civil administration being fairly large and wide-spread, much depends on the civil service to maintain harmony and reciprocity in this relationship. In India, this interaction reached its apex of warmth and cordiality in the 1950s and continued upto the early 1960s. But ever since, there started a trend towards a gradual erosion in this harmonious interaction. This trend congealed and crystallised in a vicious form in the 1970s and continues till date. As a result, there has been a change in the perception of the jawan, that he is not being attended to with the same empathy/sympathy by the civil administration as he used to be earlier. Hence, the present section intends to measure and analyse the substantial erosion in the Army-Civil Service interaction. This erosion is manifested in several spheres. Here four major indicators have been selected to prove this line of contention beyond reasonable doubt.

The lack of adequate and ready response from the civil administration is the first major indicator of the substantial erosion in the Army-Civil Service interaction. The jawan has a growing feeling that he is not being attended to with much care. His pressing grievances are generally being ignored, or looked into belatedly and in a slipshod fashion. Whenever the jawan has some problem, he puts up his petition through the "command channel". If the problem is away from the camp, the Commanding Officer sends a demi-official letter to the concerned civil authorities. Earlier, every such letter invoked a courteous and prompt response from the civil administration. But both are dismally lacking today. And if a reply comes after repeated reminders, it is usually not positive in its content. Hence, the change in his grievance redressal procedure is an indicator of their eroding relationship.

Secondly, there has been a fall in the prestige value of the armed force services. This is especially true during a prolonged peace time. Such decline in the social estimation and ranking has reduced this

once "premier occupation" into a "job in the last resort". Therefore, large vacancies exist at the lowest level in the hierarchy. Such a sorry state of affair is a product of both the jawan's inferiority complex creeping into him, and the negligence of the special position of the jawan by the civil administration.

Thirdly, the degree of erosion in the interaction pattern is also discernible from the persistent family problems of the jawan. The social process of nuclearisation, coupled with the lack of adequate co-operation from the civil administration, has heightened the insecurity in the jawan's family. Marriages have broken; divorce and desertion have become widespread; and marital discords have eaten into the vitals of a happy family life.

And the fourth indicator is the mounting frustration among the jawans. In an age of controls, quotas and permits, the jawan is now not given the due preference in allocation of controlled items like cement etc., which he once used to get. And he does not have adequate time or money to either bribe the officers or stand in the queue waiting for his turn. Thus, he is deprived of something which he rightfully deserves. Thereby, an acute sense of relative deprivation, mounting frustration due to bureaucratic apathy, and persistent family problems drive the jawan into sheer madness, culminating in either suicide or murder. And the recent cases of jawans running amok and wrecking vengeance at Delhi, Bombay, Bangalore, Rewa etc., are strongly vindicative of this trend.

In view of the above indicators of the recent substantial erosion in the interaction pattern, a few questions naturally come up: Why did such a trend start at all? What are the factors responsible for such an ominous decline in their erstwhile harmonious interaction? This prompts us to attempt causal analysis of the phenomenon by isolating and examining the relevant and responsible factors.

With social change, the socio-cultural milieu of the Indian society witnesses two contradictory social processes at two different levels. At the normative level, there is a trend towards "levelling" or "equalising"; while at the existential level, the "inequality" structure is still reinforced. And this social structure is conveniently twisted by the bureaucracy to suit its own motives. It denies special privilege and preferential treatment to an honest and sincere jawan by taking refuge in the normative order, while it resorts to all sorts of shady tricks so as to favour particular parties or persons who have the resources to keep them in good humour.

Besides, our psychological attitude towards the jawan is partly responsible for such an erosion in the interactional pattern. During war or emergency, we make heroes out of the jawans, render all possible assistance, and even go out of our way to keep them in good stead. But once normalcy is restored, we soon forget their noble achievements and sacrifice and treat them as a parasite on the national exchequer. And nothing is more brazen and shocking than our moral duplicity in this regard.

Moreover, rampant corruption in bureaucracy is another factor responsible for the present sorry state of affairs. A stage has been reached when no citizen, including the jawan, can get anything done without greasing the palms of the myriad functionaries or bringing to bear considerable influence on the officer concerned. Writing in Yojana on the bureaucrats, a veteran bureaucrat, Mr. P.S. Appu, observed.

"There was no time when the bureaucracy was entirely free from corruption. But some 30 years ago there were only very few corrupt men in the higher civil services. The great majority of them maintained high standards of probity, lived within their means and had a holy horror of misusing Government property. During the last 10 or 15 years things have changed beyond recognition. Now-a-days a large number of bureaucrats accept illegal gratification and a much larger number indulge in peccadillos....." (Yojana, Aug-15 Special, 1984, page 15).

And the jawan has neither enough dough to grease the palms with "speed money", as it is called, nor sufficient political clout to exert considerable pressure on the officials. He is the hapless victim of the system, much worse than a common man who may have either one or both of these requisites.

Again, the fatal failing of the civil administration is the low level of professionalism; inept handling of the major problems that bedevil the nation, inability to innovate and come up with imaginative solutions, lack of cost-consciousness, dilatoriness, extreme reluctance to take decisions and, above all, the unpardonable neglect of routine administration. Even it has miserably failed in discharging its age-old regulatory functions. The administrative machinery has come to a grinding halt in some areas, while in a few places it is on the verge of collapse. The bureaucrats have arrogated to themselves an ivory-tower syndrome, losing touch with the reality at the grass-root level of administration. And added to it is the peculiar caste-class bias of particular narrow-minded administrators. All these have

converged on to project a public image of the civil administration as, what Mr. Appu has dubbed, "a thoroughly demoralised, spineless, inefficient, dialotory and corrupt body."

Further, as a result of the tremendous proliferation of State's activities in the present welfare era, the volume of work has increased manifold for the Collector and the Superintendent of Police at the District level. The number of jawans from most of the districts have also increased, thereby obviating the possibility of paying personal attention to individual cases. In addition, a civil administration is faced with other pressing problems, like those of Backward Classes, the SCs and STs, linguistic and religious minorities, landless labourers, etc. And above all, the rigorous pursuit of "procedure" by the civil administration, and the unusual interest of the courts in quick disposal of the pending cases without bothering about the convenience of the jawan who is far from his native place, make the administration unresponsive to the needs of the jawan.

Besides, there has been a considerable decline in the role of the Collector because of several factors, namely, the impact of democracy, seperation of the judiciary from the executive, introduction of panchayati raj, and growing resentment of technical departments towards the Collector's dominant position in the district. The role and functions of key functionaries are not always clearly defined, resulting in a galore of confusion. And most of the decisions are taken at a low level by the subordinate staff. The findings of V.R. Gaikwad, 1971, prove that the decision-making processes at the district level are generally superficial. He observes :

"In reality, the subordinate field staff working at the block and village level took all the major decisions on which the district level merely put its rubber stamp".

Another pertinent causal factor is the "dirty politiking" by the local politicians and rural leadership. Because of numerous permutations and combinations of group alignment, they exert pressure on the civil administration to look after the interests of their members only. And in most cases, the civil administration does succumb to these political pressures. But the jawan, being always absent from the rural scenario, cannot identify himself with any of the groups. Or even if his family is identified with a particular group, he is treated almost like a 'sleeping partner' and is given the last place in the preference order within the group. Thereby, his interests suffer.

High aspiration among the jawans is another factor which contributes to their frustration. Due to our traditional and historical legacy, the jawans have inherited a view of themselves as deserving something more than the common man. And it does have a good and justifiable rationale behind. He defends the country and is prepared to sacrifice his life any moment. Thus, he performs a special duty and expects some special consideration in return. Some extra-consideration has been shown to the jawans down the ages, and world-wide. But in India, there exists a wide gap between his high expectations and low achievement, and this causes mounting frustration in him. To substantiate, till recently, the jawans with high decorations, like Vir Chakra or above, were given cash awards and land grants upto 15 acres (to which ceiling laws were not applicable) by the State Governments. But at present, they are given everything in cash and not in terms of land which they need very genuinely. Therefore, they feel frustrated and deprived of their legitimate benefits.

And lastly, the jawan himself contributes to this erosion in the Army-Civil Service interaction in his own way. In a few cases, the jawan gets himself involved in minor cases and litigations so as to obtain station leave from the Commanding Officer. Or else, he may trump up problems—domestic or otherwise—and persuade his authorities to grant him leave when he may not actually deserve it. Again, he may also present a once-sided picture of a genuine problem and bias the Commanding Officer against the civil administration. But such cases are not very frequent. And even if they are, it is the civil administration which is to be blamed. Because it is the bounden duty of the civil authorities to enquire into his problems— concocted or genuine—and report to the Commanding Officer in detail. So if the allegation is found fraudulent, the jawan would get duly punished by his own boss and would think twice before resorting to such tricks again.

These indeed are a few pertinent casual factors contributing to the erosion in the interaction between the Army and the Civil-Administration.

Over the years, the image of bureaucracy has been badly tarnished in the perception of the jawan. And a yawning credibility gap exists between himself and the civil administration. But what has gone wrong and where? And is the credibility lost irretrievably?

The answer is hopefully negative. There is still time to mend the ways and take corrective measures to restore the high degree of

credibility which once prevailed in their pattern of interaction. But such measures shall necessarily be based on the premise that : what is needed is not any revolutionary change or systemic overhaul, but an optimum combination of both preventive and curative approaches at the sub-systemic and micro-systemic levels.

Such restorative measures can be analysed in the following five issue-areas : security of the family, security of land and property, disposal of litigations, general welfare and rehabilitation, and the domain of civil administration.

A. SECURITY OF THE FAMILY

Family, the nucleus of the jawan's emotional strength, has to be gauranteed full and effective security by the civil administration. Barring stray cases of family breakdown due to voluntary desertion by the wife-mother element, the civil authorities must ensure full protection to the family as and when required. Specific measures can be initiated in two aspects of the problem : special directives to the police, and liberalisation of arms licensing procedure.

(i) Special Directives to the Police :

The Collector and the Superintendent of Police should send special directives to the Station House Officers or the Officer-in-Charge of the local police stations so as to :

- **render prompt and effective assistance to the jawan's family when solicited, especially against the local goons and hoodlums, village touts, hostile neighbours and relatives;
- **offer protection against forcible eviction of the jawan's family or forcible occupation of their residence so long as the jawan is absent; in other words, maintenance of status quo as regards his family's residence during his absence;
- **undertake prompt and impartial enquiry at a high level in case of any complaints by the jawan's family; and
- **ensure non-registration of cases against a jawan's family unless duly permitted by the next higher officer (above SHO/O-in-C) so as to discourage the filing of concocted complaints.

(ii) Liberalisation of Arms Licensing Procedure :

As a deterrent against kidnapping by gangs, the jawan needs arms to protect his family. Under the Arms Act, the Collector can sanction arms licence to a jawan without verifying his antecedents. But then the jawan has to keep the weapon always with himself. Since he remains away from his family for a considerable duration, his weapons serves little purpose. So he wants to append

the name of a retainer (his brother or any other family member) who would keep the weapon in his absence to protect the family. But the antecedents of the retainer has to be verified by the police as per the recent amendment to the Arms Act. So there is undue delay and harrasment where time is of essence. And once the jawan goes back to his barrack, there may be no one to pursue his case. Therefore, in such exceptional cases requiring urgent attention, the Collector should personally expedite the verification procedure and issue the arms licence with promptitude.

B. SECURITY OF LAND AND PROPERTY

In order to guarantee the security of land and property of the jawan, the civil administration should undertake the following measures:

- (i) to promote awareness among the jawans and their families regarding various Government measures, such as, land to the landless jawan, special concessions to the jawan in tenant cultivation, consolidation of land holdings, etc.;
- (ii) not to give disputed or fallow or unproductive land to the jawan and render him protection against any encroachment;
- (iii) to accord priority to the jawan in land consolidation measures, allot him land of equivalent or better quality, and undertake consolidation of the jawans land only when he is present;
- (iv) to undertake special measures securing jawan against any form of pressure and litigation regarding tenancy rights, and to take to legal recourse against the defaulting or unscrupulous tenants;
- (v) to institute high level enquires into complaint by any party against a jawan regarding land or property so as to ensure careful and impartial enquiry and to provide deterrent punishment to the false complainants;
- (vi) to accord priority in land allotment to jawans with high decorations who prefer land to cash; and
- (vii) to ensure prompt disbursement of compensation directly to the jawan (without any intermediary) in cases of Government's acquisition of the jawan's land for public purpose.

C. DISPOSAL OF LITIGATIONS

Because of his prolonged absence from the home front, the jawan is an unenviable victim of various types of litigations: revenue, civil and criminal. The causes and frequency of such litigations have been discussed in detail in Section I. So what remains to be analysed

is how to ensure a convenient and expeditious disposal of such cases without depriving the jawan of his right to be heard.

Such litigations are mainly the revenue, civil and criminal ones. The revenue litigations arise under, and are decided by, the Collector. Despite the heavy work load and busy schedules, it is his duty to ensure that the jawan gets an expeditious and just decision. The hearing should not be unnecessarily adjourned, causing harassment to jawan coming from very distant areas. In this regard, the Collector can call a monthly meeting to review the revenue litigations involving the jawan, and give directives to the revenue officials to expedite such cases, including fixing up a convenient date for hearing.

In the civil and criminal cases, after the separation of the judiciary from the executive, the Collector does not any more have the authority to take decisions. It is the District Judge and the Sessions Judge (or the District and Sessions Judge being one person who decide the civil and criminal litigations respectively. When under the Collector, the grievance redressal mechanism was simple and effective. But now there exists no institutional practice so far as the civil and criminal cases are concerned. Therefore, a new institutional arrangement should be evolved and crystallised in which representatives from the police, the magistracy and the judiciary at the District Level should :

- **meet, atleast, once a month;
- **review the pending cases involving the jawan;
- **decide the dates for hearing after due consultation and keeping in view the response of the jawan; and
- **take follow-up measures in all cases for prompt dispensation of justice.

This, indeed would go a long way in restoring the lost confidence of the jawan in the civil administration. He would find the dates for hearing convenient, the cases being decided expeditiously, and the administration responsive to his needs.

D. GENERAL WELFARE AND REHABILITATION

While the guarantees of security of family, property, and disposal of litigations are preventive and prohibitive in nature, the general welfare and rehabilitation measures are positive and promotional incentives, intended to create confidence and restore credibility of the jawan in civil administration. These measures can be discussed

for the three distinct target-groups, namely, the awan's family, the ex-servicemen and the war victims.

(i) *General Welfare Measures for Jawan's family :*

The Government should take prompt and effective measures to provide an attractive package of assistance to the jawan's family. These should aim at providing :

- **better health care facilities to the family members;
- **free education to the children in selected schools, like the Central Schools which were originally meant for the children of the servicemen;
- **housing on a preferential basis, or plots, loans, cement and other essential building materials at a concessional rate;
- **reservation of seats for the children in the States, medical, engineering and other colleges;
- **reservation of jobs under certain categories; and
- **an economic package of different governmental programmes and subsidies for the creation of productive assets in the jawan's family.

(ii) *Welfare and Rehabilitation Measures for the Ex-Servicemen :*

The welfare and rehabilitation measures for ex-servicemen undertaken by the Central Government have been discussed at length in Section-I. The States have thus far lagged behind. Hence, they should adopt various policies and programmes, which may inter-alia, include :

- **reservation of jobs at lower levels of State administration;
- **provision of employment in various schemes like ecological task forces, agricultural task forces, peace-keeping forces etc.; and
- **preparing them for self-employment by giving them proper training, adequate resources on liberal conditions, including subsidies, land, transport, and marketing facilities, etc.

All these would make the State Governments in general, and the civil administration in particular, highly credible in the eyes of a jawan.

(iii) *Rehabilitation of War Victims:*

Most of the rehabilitative measures undertaken by the Central Government for the war victims have been enumerated and discussed in Section-I. To add to this, the State Governments should provide :

- **jobs for atleast one member from each of such bereaved families;
- **liberal pension concessions; cash grants, and ex-gratia allotment of land for agriculture;

- **full cost of education for higher studies;
- **residential plots at concessional rates;
- **employment or business, like dealership or agency of profitable products, and
- **reservation of seats for the jawans' children in colleges and technical institutions funded by the State.

In implementation of these programmes for the three distinct target-groups, the civil administration plays a central role, overseeing the initial and followup measures, and improving its relationship with the Army.

E. DOMAIN OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATION : SOME SUGGESTED CHANGES

The proposed changes in the domain of civil administration can be grouped under three broad heads : the administrative environment, a new administrative structure, and the operational dynamic of the administration.

(i) *Changes in the Administrative Environment:*

The administrative environment is integrally related to the broad socio-political universe within which the bureaucratic machine operates. So any modification, alteration or refinement in the former is a function of the direction and degree of social progress at the macro-level. This is, therefore, a stupendous task. Still, efforts at some positive incremental, goal-oriented changes will bring a cumulative change in the administrative environment.


In this connection, efforts can be directed systematically at two major evils : corruption in bureaucracy, and political interference. Corruption in bureaucracy is symptomatic of the deep malaise that has afflicted the Indian society. True. But this is no excuse for the bureaucrats to justify their corruption. In fact, being educated and responsible officers, they should take the lead in setting personal standards of honesty and integrity. This may, in the long run, create a positive impact on the society at large.

As regards political interference, there is, however, a word of caution. The Indian politicians, of course, engage in the dirty games of politics. But the major share of guilt must be on the civil servants themselves. The unsavoury truth is that in most cases the civil servants have been active collaborators, and not just silent spectators or reluctant accomplices in running the civil services. Fawning sycophants, with their plastic conscience and malleable back-bone, are given preference over men with neutrality and integrity. Hence, it is for the civil servants to mend his own ways, and politely but firmly resist political interference whatsoever.

(ii) *A New Administrative Structure:*

After studying and analysing the failings and inadequacies of the existing cumbersome structure, a new structural pattern can be suggested ;

: MATRIX OF AN ORGANIZATIONAL SET-UP :



At the Central level, a working committee with representatives from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and the Ministry of Defence can be formed. And the Chairman of the Committee shall be the Secretary, MHA, as the committee would primarily deal with the functioning of the civil services. The committee may co-ordinate activities between the two Ministries and issue policy guidelines and directives to the hierarchy below.

At the State level, the Chief Secretary heads a Co-ordination Committee with representatives from the Departments of Revenue, Finance, Home, Social Welfare Agriculture, and Industries. The Chief Secretary shall personally look into the functioning of the committee. But if a State has more than 20,000 jawans, the said committee should be headed by a Special Secretary answerable directly to the Chief Secretary.

Below him comes the Collector at the District level. A special Cell should be created under his authority so as to monitor and protect the interests of the jawans. And if need be, the Cell may include a representative each from the district judiciary and the police.

The Sub-Divisional Officer, answerable directly to the Collector, functions at the sub-divisional level and looks after the interests of the jawans and their families.

The Block Development Officer functions directly under the SDO and operates at the Block level. But because of his key position and heavy work-load at the cutting edge of administration, he may depute a Special Officer to look after the affairs of the jawans and their families only if there are more than 100 such families.

Thus, this administrative pyramid has five distinctive characteristics :

- **it creates a national administrative net-work, meant for the welfare of the jawans, radiating from the Centre to all the Blocks;
- **it ensures, atleast theoretically, uniformity of treatment, to the jawans and their families all over the country;
- **it operates at five distinct levels, each level with its defined sphere of competence;
- **the chain of command or authority has the Working Committee, the Chief Secretary/Special Secretary, and the Collector, as the key functionaries; and
- **the chain of responsibility weighs heavily on the Special Officer/BDO. SDO and the Collector.

(iii) *Changes in the operational dynamics of Administration :*

Changes in the administrative environment and administrative structure shall not be productive without the requisite changes in the operational dynamics of administration.

The administration should evolve an effective policy planning procedure for the target-group, that is the jawans. It should undertake anticipatory policy planning for contingencies, specific policy formulations, policy evaluation so as to correct deficiencies therein, performance appraisal, and collection of feed-back. This should preferably be taken up at the State level where the information system can be centralised and the process properly co-ordinated.

Secondly, there is an urgent need to infuse a high level of professionalism in the civil administration. This includes innovation, problem-solving attitude, managerial capability, efficient communication skills, dynamism and pragmatism. Conscious efforts should be made to make the administrators shed their ivory-tower syndrome; and in this context, it would be quite appropriate if a few selected

officers are annually deputed for a short stint in the armed forces, like that in the United States. This would make them pragmatic and sympathetic to the genuine problems of a jawan.

Another pressing problem is that the petition of the jawan does not always reach the authority whom it is addressed to. Because, due to a heavy work-load, the correspondence is usually handled by a clerk, or at best by the private secretary to the officer concerned, who gives noting on the letters and decides their fate. Hence, the district officials, especially the Collector and Additional Collector, should evolve a new working style, i.e. opening all the letters themselves so as not to miss any complaint or information which otherwise would not have reached them due to the inept handling and biased decision-making by the low level functionaries.

A virulent charge against the civil administration is that it is blind and unresponsive to the complaints and needs of the jawan. It is true to a great extent. And in some cases, the officials find the jawan's letter irritating or illogical and just sit on it. But that is not the way of doing things. It should, at least, be responsive, if not always favourable. Hence, it is the bounden duty of the high officials to acknowledge the complaints or letters, ensure follow-up action, give a fair and patient hearing to the complainant, take quick decisions and convey the same explaining the rationale behind such decisions, and allot these works to an efficient lower functionary and make him responsible for any deliberate lapses whatsoever. Justice should not only be done, it should also seem to have been done. Indeed, the entire image of bureaucracy rests on its responsiveness to popular grievances.

Many jawans are dissatisfied with the standard of efficiency with which the enquiries into their complaints are carried out. In fact, the enquiries should be undertaken at a high level so as to reduce the probability of corruption and bias, and making it impartial, objective and sympathetic. And this is not too difficult a task for the civil administration to carry out.

Again, the jawan desires priority treatment from the civil administration. He belongs to a special service, does a very special job, and wishes a little extra-consideration in return. But at present, even that is not being shown to him. This becomes a legitimate grudge against the bureaucracy. Hence, the jawan should be accorded priority treatment wherever and whenever possible. For example, in the allotment of cement quotas recently, out of a quarterly quota of 6,000 bags, the Collector of Bhind (M.P.) used to keep 1,000-1,500 bags at the disposal of the Secretary, Zilla Sainik Board for allotment

to needy jawans. If this could be done in one district, why not every where? Quotas apart, the officials are expected to be courteous and gentle to the disciplined soldiers. And their conduct rules, in fact, stipulate that. Showing respect and honour does not cost at all. Rather it wins friends and helps them understand the problems of the officials.

Besides, it is essential for the District Administration to compile a list of the serving and retired jawans of the area in consultation with the Zilla Sainik Board. This helps the administration to reach out and establish personal contacts, to facilitate planning for them and include them in various package of beneficiary-oriented programmes, and to review the progress and take suitable corrective measures. Also, being the Chairman, the Collector should monitor the functioning of the Zilla Sainik Board, whose key official is the Secretary, usually an ex-service personnel. An efficient Secretary can pursue the case of jawans within the district administration, and help in the redressal of their grievances.

Further, there should be regular review conferences at the State level, at least biannually, so as to assess the progress of various plans and programmes meant for the jawans.

And lastly, the high level officials, directly associated with the welfare of the jawans and their families should undertake periodic visits to their villages and families. It would inculcate a sense of security and proximity in the minds of the jawans. It would also deter the unscrupulous elements from causing them any trouble. Besides, it would enable the officials to collect first-hand information and to see things as they are. Suggested below is a prototype itinerary for the high level officials in the civil administration :

A PROTOTYPE ITINERARY FOR FIELD OFFICIALS IN CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

<u>Functionary</u>	<u>Frequency of Visit</u>	<u>Objectives/Functions</u>
Collector	Once in 3 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> —Visit to the Block to meet representatives of jawans' families; —hear grievances personally; —take decisions on the spot.
SDM/SDO	Once in a month	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> —visit to gram panchayats to meet jawans' families; —hear grievances personally; —take decisions or refer to the Collector.

BDO	Once in a fortnight	—visit on request and attend personally to particular families; —take decisions or refer to higher officials,
Special Officer	As often as possible	—to collect first-hand information regarding jawans' families; —report to the BDO; —convey the follow-up measures to the families.

These are, in fact, a few important confidence-building measures, aimed at restoring the waning credibility of the civil administration in the perception of the jawans.

IV

Indeed, the Army occupies a pivotal and pre-eminent position in the Indian society. The very existence and survival of the country as a nation primarily depends on the quality—both physical and psycho-moral—of the Army. And history attests to the fact that from the days of Chandragupta Maurya upto the advent of the British Raj, and even beyond, the military was the prime coalescing force, maintaining the unity and integrity of the Empire. It would not be an exaggeration to opine that the rise and fall of the major empires in history was chiefly a function of the efficiency and organisation of the existing military machine.

In the present context, the Indian Army has a dual responsibility. Besides protecting the national border (15,168 Kms of land and 5,689 Kms of maritime border) and acting as a veritable deterrent against any form of real or anticipated foreign aggression, it maintains internal unity and integrity of the nation by coming in the aid of the civil administration in emergent situations. It is often deployed by the civil authorities to contain and crush communal riots and other major law and order problems, to maintain the essential services in case of snap strikes, and to mobilise its resources in the aid of the nation on a war-footing during grave natural calamities. These peace-time functions have become more pronounced now than they were in the past.

And the jawan is an integral human element of the grand military machine. He has the great honour to wear the country's uniform; and in return, he is willing to lay down his life at the altar of national security. But like every human being, he does have his own problems and proclivities, which are to be cared for by the nation. His problems have to be attended to with sincerity, sympathy and promptitude and then only the nation can expect its jawan to be ever prepared to sacrifice his precious life with pride and contentment.

Considering the magnitude of a jawan's immense responsibility, it is logical to conclude that it is in the interests of the nation to accord a preferential treatment to him. Indeed, no human life carries a price tag, and the least of all the jawan's. So the person who is ever willing and eager to die for his nation, certainly deserves something more than the common citizenry. Therefore, it is the sacrosanct duty of the bureaucracy—the executive arm of the Government—to look after the interests of the jawan.

Bureaucracy in a transitional society assumes an entrepreneurial role as an initiator of change. But in India, it is in a total mess. It is equivocal and unresponsive, marked by red-tapism, rampant corruption and declining professional ethics. All these have converged in to shock the body-polity into a state of partial paralysis.

Thus, a question naturally comes up: Is our bureaucracy adequately equipped to carry out its tremendous social responsibilities? The answer is a cold, blunt "No". It is not a part of the chorus of criticism against the civil service or a rule of the game of 'bureaucracy-baiting', which appears to have become a favorite past-time of many. Objectively seen, in the troubled and trying times, the bureaucracy has put in, on the whole, a record performance deserving some kudos and not total condemnation. Having said this, one must hasten to add that praise or blame will do little to alter the situation which must be attended to if the bureaucracy has to acquire a new sense of direction, its performance capability sharpened, and its waning credibility restored.

In this context, the corrective measures suggested in the previous section in the five issue-areas become pertinent. These should be pursued with absolute sincerity, devotion and integrity so that the Army-Civil Service interaction regains its erstwhile warmth and vigour. Or else, if the present trend continues, the nation's Army will surely be in a sorry state. There will be frustration, demoralisation covert unwillingness to sacrifice life or lead precarious life-style, and an all-round impoverishment of the Army and the nation.

And it is not too late to brace ourselves up for taking initiatives to stem the rot and retrieve the country from the quagmire of degeneration. It is the moral duty of the bureaucracy and the citizenry at large to treat the current malady afflicting the body-polity as a problem of management of change; to monitor the reversal of the present ominous trend with resolution and vigour, and to give a new healthy direction congenial to the harmonious interaction between the Army and the Civil Service. Both will gain profitably, as will the nation as a whole.

The Aksai Chin

SAHDEV VOHRA, ICS (RETD).

I

THE main disputed area under Chinese occupation on the Indo-Chinese border is Aksai Chin and its adjoining areas between Ladakh and Tibet & Sinkiang. This is a wedge of territory of about 15000 square miles area occupied by the Chinese after 1949 in a series of advances culminating in the Indo-Chinese War of 1962. The Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai then claimed it as a part of Sinkiang or Chinese Turkestan. It is relevant to see what the position was in regard to this area according to the records available in the National Archives of India under the British rule. The first Englishman to visit Aksai Chin was one Johnson, a Civil Assistant engaged in the Great Trigonometrical Survey started in 1820s. In 1865 he was deputed to survey the area north of the Chang Chenmo Valley in Ladakh. While this was his assignment he actually managed to cross over into the territory of Chinese Turkestan at the invitation of the ruler of Khotan. Johnson, it was hoped "might succeed in obtaining a view of some of the towns in Khotan from the Trigonometrical stations on the summits of the Kuen-Lun range, the boundary between the territories of the maharajah and the Province of Khotan."¹ Instead, Johnson managed to go to Khotan at the invitation of its ruler. A part of Chinese Turkestan, Khotan had revolted against the Chinese and overcome the garrison. Soon after, the central part of Chinese Turkestan, Yarkand and Kashgar, also revolted against the Chinese, and Yakub Beg from Khokand became the ruler of that part of Chinese Turkestan. The ruler of Khotan felt insecure at the hands of Yakub Beg and was anxious to get British help. He dispatched an emissary, Juma Khan, for the purpose to India, and now he invited Johnson as the only Englishman in the vicinity, to come and visit him at his capital, Ilchi. Johnson brought back a great deal of geographical information "of regions which have hitherto been a blank on our maps".² *Inter alia*, this information was about the route across Aksai Chin whereby Johnson reached Khotan, as well as about another route which lay to the east and

which connected Keriya in Khotan with Rudok in Tibet without going across the Maharaja of Kashmir's territory. He was told about it by Yarkandi merchants as a much easier route which avoided both Aksai Chin and the Kuen-Lun range. It was "said to be practicable for wheeled traffic and to possess a great advantage over all other routes in that wood, grass and water were available at every stage"³.

Johnson was censured by the Government of India for crossing the frontier into Khotan without permission, but his superior Lt. Col. Walker, the Superintendent of Trigonometrical Survey, defended him by saying, "no Englishman possessing a moderate amount of enterprise and zeal for public service could have allowed such an opportunity to slip through his hand"⁴. In the previous working season Johnson had been working on the Karakoram Pass route and had halted at Suket where a messenger from the "Khan Badshah" of Khotan had come to meet him to invite him to Khotan. But he had missed Johnson who had by then left for Leh. This year "a native of Central Asia" met him at Leh and presented a letter from the Khotan ruler inviting him to Ilchi, and Johnson was in any case going to the area north of the Chang Chenmo valley for his work. It took him a march of twenty stages from Leh to the passes over the Kuen Lun range. The route followed by him was not the usual one but the one traversed by Juma Khan, the emissary of Khotan to the British. He had taken this route, and was in fact a pioneer, because the usual route from Sinkiang to Leh was in the possession of Yakub Beg. Johnson reached Chang Chenmo Valley from Leh in ten stages and next crossed the range of hills running east to west and forming the northern boundary of the valley. Thereafter in his words, "I marched on high extensive table lands.... that a horse might be galloped over them everywhere". The first plain was about 17,300 feet above the sea level and, he says, "bears traces of having been the bed of a large lake, and at present contains two lakes which are probably much larger in April and May on the melting of snows. A second plain slopes for a distance of 30 miles in north-easterly direction from 16,700 (feet) down to 15,300 (feet) when it rises again to the watershed of the Kuen-Lun. I traversed these two plains and a third lying to the north-west of the second"⁵.

Johnson observed from the hills he ascended the panoramic views of the region, and saw that there were more plains of considerable extent to the east and south-east. To the west however were,

not plains, but deep valleys providing the water for one of the principal affluents of the Karakash river. He struck this river at a point west of one of the Great Trigonometrical stations (lat. $35^{\circ} 53' 36''$ and long. $79^{\circ} 28' 32''$, height 21,767 feet). From the route details given by Johnson we learn that the eleventh stage (and the first across the range forming the northern boundary of the Chang Chenmo Valley) was Lumkang at the foot of this range to the north. Stage 12 was Nischu on the other side of the Lumkang pass. Stages 13, 14 were Burcha-thang and Tso-thang, the latter being near a salt water lake. The road to it "lay over a plain which has the appearance of having been the bed of a large lake, the soil was covered with salt petre to the depth of about six inches". Stages 15, 16, 17 were Huzakhar, Mapo-thang and Yang-pa. He notes that the quantity of "salt petre which lays on the ground to the depth of about 9 inches which is so white that the whole plain has the appearance of being covered with snow".

At stage 18, he halted on the left bank of the Kara Kash river "at a distance of about 20 miles from its sources in the Kuen-Lun range which lies immediately to the north and east". He notes that a few stonehuts had been built on the right bank by Juma Khan. Then he travelled up the Kuen-Lun and the route lay up a sandy ravine to the Khatai DIWAN pass (17500 feet). "There is a good road from this place along the left bank to Shadulla, situated on the route between Karakoram Pass and Yarkand".⁶ At the next (19th) stage, called Tash, Johnson halted at a stone hut erected by Juma Khan on the left bank of the Yanga-pa river. The route now lay up a ravine to the Yangi Diwan Pass (19,092 feet). He notes, "It is reported that this route was discovered and used for the first time by Juma Khan". Stage 20 was Khush-lash Langar and Stage 21 Brinjga. The latter "is a famous grazing ground. The passes to it, viz, the Yangi Diwan and the Naia Khan Diwan are in the Kuen Lun mountains"⁷. Johnson crossed over into Khotan at Brinjga where the Wazir of Khotan received him. This was the "first encampment beyond the Ladak boundary"⁸. Johnson crossed the Kuen-Lun by passes which were first used by Juma Khan on his way to India. About the plains of Aksai Chin Johnson states that they were "perfectly uninhabited and devoid of all vegetation with the exception of the lavender plant; fresh water is also very scarce, that of the numerous lakes in these plains being very brackish"⁹.

Johnson stayed in Khotan for 16 days during which time he visited Keriya and other towns. It was with great difficulty that he

was able to persuade the ruler to let him go. The return route he took was via the Sanju Diwan Pass, then along the Kara Kash river for four days to Shadula and "the Maharajah's guard house there". He was accompanied "by the Roja Beg or Governor of Sanju, who had been ordered by the Khan of Khotan to accompany me as far as the Maharajah's boundary..... I finally quitted Shadula for Leh on 8th November, first marching up the left bank of the Kara Kash river and then turning west up the broad and open valley called the Suket, at the head of which I crossed Sukit Diwan Pass"¹⁰. On this route also he found the Kuen Lun range to be the boundary. When Johnson crossed the Kalian Pass down to Kalian village he notes, the Chinese always kept a guard of 50 men to prevent strangers".¹¹ After that he reached Shadula as already noted.

II

While Johnson was visiting Khotan, the Maharaja of Kashmir's agents were visiting the territories that had come under Yakub Beg. The reports sent by them were passed on to the British authorities by the Maharaja as the revolt in Sinkiang coincided with the advance of Russia in Central Asia. The Russians took Tashkend which was under the rulers of Khokand and next turned their attention to Bokhara and Khokand which latter is the area around Ferghana. These agents travelled from Leh to Yarkand and Yangi Hissar where the ancient fort was being used to hold 400 Chinese soldiers as prisoners. They next reached Kashgar and from thence proceeded to Khokand. They were however stopped from proceeding thither by a guard of 100 Bokhara soldiers. They learnt that the Bokhara forces had attacked the forces of Khokand who "fell to Yarkand in great disorder. The refugees finding Kashgar without an owner took possession of it and the Chinese garrisons of the fort of Kashgar were annihilated."¹² Eventually, Yakub Beg, guardian of the Prince of Khokand established himself as the Ruler of Kashgaria which included the whole of Sinkiang except the northern Ili region which was taken by the Russians.

Another agent of the Maharaja visited Khotan. He reported that the Russians had slain 500 Khokandees when they captured Tashkend and "the only man of Khokand who escaped is the present Kosh Begi"¹³ i.e., Yakub Beg. He reported also the capture of Yarkand in March 1866. Thereafter Yakub Beg took Khotan. Information was also being sent to the British by the Muslim news-letter

writer at Leh. He reported the departure for winter of the Maharaja's guard of ten soldiers at Shadula. He also reported the arrival of a European, in his letter dated 31 July 1866, "from the direction of Tashi Kang in the Aksai-Chin"¹⁴. In his letter dated 26 Aug 1866 he reports that Yakub Beg "has conferred a valuable *Khillat* on the ruler of Sarikol who came to see him at Yarkand and has sent him back and instructed him to warn Ghuznun Khan and the other Kunjooti chiefs not to plunder on the Yarkand road, that if they persisted in such conduct he would destroy them."¹⁵ Sarikol is the south western part of Sinkiang adjoining Russia and Hunza (Kunjoot). Yakub Beg was just in time when he extended his authority here because the Russians were pressurising the Khan of Bokhara to allow them passage to Sarikol. The letter-writer notes that the Russians were "demanding passage to Tash Koorgan in Sarikol from the King of Bokhara but were refused". At the same time, Yakub Beg put the people of Hunza under notice to desist from their hereditary trade of plundering the caravans from Leh to Yarkand or those in the reverse direction. The letter writer further reported on October 1, 1866 that the King of Bokhara was encamped at Khokand when the Russian forces crossed the Sir Darya. "A battle was fought in which both sides suffered. Then in a night attack the king inflicted a great loss on the Russians".

Under these conditions the British were relieved that Yakub Beg was proving a strong ruler. They wanted to strengthen his hands against the Russians, and at the same time they wished to find opportunities for trading with Central Asia; if possible by avoiding the territories of the Maharaja of Kashmir because of the vexatious behaviour of his staff, and the heavy exactions levied by them. A leading proponent of the expansion of trade by avoiding the Kashmir territory was a Punjab civilian Forsyth. He wanted to explore routes by which Kulu and not Leh would be the market for exchange of goods between Yarkand and the South. Forsyth had learnt from Hayward and Shaw who had crossed the Aksai Chin subsequently to Johnson, that a trade route could be developed from Lahoul-Spiti to Sinkiang which would avoid Leh. Forsyth persuaded the Government of India to allow the exploration of this route. The Maharaja was forced to sign an agreement in 1870 for the survey of the Chang Chenmo Valley and to its north. Under the treaty two Joint Commissioners were appointed, one by the Maharaja and one by the British. The latter was Dr. Cayley, the British agent at Leh. The same year Forsyth set forth on a mission to Yakub Beg by this

route. Cayley reports on 28 July, 1870 from his camp on the Kara Kash river that he had come on ahead of Forsyth. In Lingzi-Thang, Cayley met messengers sent back by the Kashmir Government employees at Shadulla that preparations were being made for Forsyth's reception¹⁶. The Forsyth party however met with a serious mischance and the party lost a hundred horses. However, Forsyth forged ahead and reached near Shadulla and the envoys of Yakub Beg were waiting for him. Further journey was however given up. Cayley returned by a different route which he said "avoids many of the pitfalls of Lingzi-Thang and Soda Plains and lay more to the west, via Kizil Jilga, which was used by Hayward on his return journey from Yarkand". Forsyth also returned by this route.

Forsyth went to Yarkand in 1873. The advance party consisting of Henderson and Hume took the route across Lingzi-Thang and reached Shadulla. Forsyth found Yakub Beg agreeable to a commercial treaty but the Russian presence in his capital was overpowering. He allowed the Forsyth mission to carryout a survey of the routes leading to the Pamir mountains along which a Russian advance was apprehended. Lt. Colonel Gordon and party crossed the Little Pamir and were received by the ruler of Wakhan. There the party divided into two, one under Biddulph explored "the Burroghie and Durkot passes leading to Yassein",¹⁷ while the other took the road to the Great Pamir. Both met at Aktash and returned to Sarikol in 1874. After the return of the Forsyth mission, Robert Shaw was sent with the ratified treaty back to Kashgar. He also found procrastination on the part of Yakub Beg. Shaw reported that the Kunjoots were making incursions on the Kokyar road in Yarkand territory.¹⁸ In the meanwhile one British trader, T. Russell travelled to Sinkiang. Russell came by the Chang Chenmo route and across Aksai Chin to Shadulla. He reported that the conditions for trade were encouraging. He returned by the Karakoram Pass and noted that Malikshah "would appear to define the boundary of His Highness the Amir of Kashgar's territory"¹⁹. Malikshah is three stages from Shadulla on the Karakoram route. With the sudden death of Yakub Beg in 1876, Shaw had to return and the proposed commercial treaty remained unsigned. The Chinese re-established their hold over Sinkiang.

@ Dr Stolieza of the Forsyth mission also surveyed the road to Kizil Jilga and north-west to Aktagh without any undue difficulty. See D. Woodman "Himalayan Frontiers".

III

Younghusband was responsible for making the policy decision that the Chinese should be used to take possession of the territory between the Karakoram mountains and the Kuen Lun Range so as to provide a buffer between Russian advance and the British empire in India. Younghusband had travelled in 1885 from China to Sinkiang and from Sarikol crossed into Baltistan along the Glaciers, a route that had never been attempted by the white man for crossing into India. Younghusband established his reputation by this feat and when he got the chance revisited the trans-Karakoram area in 1889—this time from the Indian side. As we have seen, the people of Hanza, the Kunjoots, found "the most profitable hunting ground—for they were professional robbers—between Leh and Yarkand over the Karakoram Pass, and many a rich caravan on its way from India to Central Asia had been waylaid and foraged in the neighbourhood of Shadullah".²⁰ The Russians had advanced into the Pamirs and the British authorities in India were perplexed as to whether the Russians will advance via Chitral, Hunza or the Sarikol route. The no-man's land between the Karakoram/Muztagh Range and the Kuen-Lun Range consisted of the Raksam Valley and the water-shed of the Yarkand river on the west, and the Aksai Chin and the water-shed of the Karakash river on the east.

In 1888 the key point of Shadulla which had been vacated by the Kashmir authorities at the insistence of the British, was subjected to Kunjooti raids and the Kirghiz nomads who were the only inhabitants had sought protection from the Chinese *Tao Tai* at Kashgar. But they were told by him that the Chinese posts were at Killian and Sanju, the outlying passes to the south of the Kuen-Lun, and since the Kirghiz were living south of these posts they could not expect protection from the Sinkiang authorities.²¹ The Kirghiz then approached Captain Ramsay the British Commissioner at Leh. Ramsay sought instructions recommending that the fort at Shadulla should be allowed to be occupied by the Kashmir authorities. Younghusband was deputed to go to Shadulla to study the situation on the spot, and also to go to Hunza from the north to find out more about the possible routes that the Russians might take. The British had information that a Russian agent had met the *Thum* of Hunza and had offered him Russian assistance. Younghusband travelled in 1889 to the Chang Chenmo valley and from there to Shadulla. He made friends with Turdi Beg the leader of the Kirghiz there, gave him some money

to repair the fort, and sent a merchant Juma Khan whom Turdi recommended as suitable for the purpose, to convey Younghusband's greetings to the Chinese Amban at Yarkand. He was apprehensive that the Chinese might not take kindly to the British presence there and wanted to make sure that no exaggerated reports reached the Chinese about the British intentions.

From Shadulla Younghusband made haste to proceed to the west to explore the passes leading to Hunza, and to explore the Pamirs to find out what was militarily possible by way of a march from the Pamirs to the south by the Russians. He had sent a message to another officer, Bower, who was exploring the Pamirs that they should meet in the Taghdumbash Pamirs which lay on the route from the Great Pamirs to Hunza. To his surprise he met a Russian officer Gromchevsky on 24th October²² and learning that he intended to go to Leh, sent a message to the Maharaja of Kashmir, "I met a Russian near a river at Yarkand. His name is Gromchevsky. He has an application to go to Ladakh and then to Tibet via Tangsi. He has been detained at Shadulla Khoja. There are six sepoys in his company". Actually Younghusband ran into Gromchevsky near the Taghdumbash Pamirs. The latter was quite open with him and told him of his visit the previous year to Hunza after receipt of two letters of invitation from the *Thum*. But Younghusband coached the Kirghiz to mislead him with regard to the route to Leh so that the Russian reached Polu with difficulty after losing his pack horses.

Younghusband had managed to go across the Raksam Valley and the passes leading to Hunza. In his report to Durand the Foreign Secretary he wrote, "I have discovered a subsidiary range between the Karakoram and the Kuen-Lun running parallel to them in a north westerly direction. The name of the country Raskam (Ras-Kan) means a 'real mine' "²³ which he presumed to show that mining was done in this area. About his journey from the Raksam Valley to the Passes leading to Hunza, Younghusband wrote to the British Resident at Srinagar, "The (Shimshal) Pass I find to be an extremely easy one. Its value from a military point of view is completely lost on account of the very difficult nature of the country beyond on the Kanjut side."²⁴ The emissary sent to the Amban of Yarkand also returned and he reported to Durand, "The merchant from Shahdulla whom I sent to Amban of Yarkand returned... The Amban said it would be a very good thing if Shahidulla again became populated and prosperous". This relieved Younghusband of the anxiety of how the Chinese would react to his visit.

After this on 23rd October he met Gromchevsky as already described. He showed Younghusband a map marking a sharp wedge of country in between the Afghan territory of Wakhan and the western boundary of China. This strengthened Younghusband in his resolve that something should be done to occupy this area. "The Taghdumbash was inhabited by the Kirghiz who could be snapped up as easily as the Shahidulla Kirghiz", he wrote. In conclusion he wrote on 30th December to Lt. Col. Nisbet the Resident at Kashmir, "The two strategical points to be guarded are Gilgit and Leh of which the former is by far the more important; and between the two points there is no possibility of a force penetrating from the north."²⁵ Giving thought to the question how the approaches to India could be insulated against Russian advance, he wrote, "As the Chinese invariably refuse to protect the Kirghiz if they live on the southern side of the Kuen-Lun range, it would be better perhaps to take them under our influence."²⁶ Later, he was to change his mind when the Chinese were persuaded by him to advance to Shahidulla, and the Karakoram Pass.

Back in India, Younghusband was lauded and came to be regarded as the authority on the question of defence in the north from the Russians. News was received from Captain Ramsay at Leh in 1890 that the Chinese had come to Shahidulla and it was noted that "at any rate it keeps the Russians out". "Shahidulla has never before been occupied by the Chinese. It is not improbable that the occupation of Shahidulla is due to Russian instigation in opposition to us, as until the arrival of Gromchevsky the Chinese had showed no signs of coming to that place."²⁷ This note was written on 27th January 1890. After two months on 28 March 1890 Younghusband noted that he had received a letter from his friend Turdi Kol as well as one from Gromchevsky. The latter had started from Shahidulla for Polu.

Younghusband was coming round to the view of his mentor Ney Elias who after his trip to the Pamirs in 1885 had noted that while China had withdrawn behind the right bank of the Aksu (Oxus), the Afghans had made no attempt to assume authority on the left bank."²⁸ While Elias had hoped that the vacuum would be filled by the Afghans coming up to the left bank of the Oxus river, Younghusband felt that the Chinese were more likely to fill the role of a Buffer between the Russians and the Kashmir frontier. As for the Karakash watershed to the east Younghusband noted, "Captain Ramsay has frequently advised the taking of our frontier as far north as Shahidulla, 79 miles beyond the crest of the Karakoram range..... Mr. Elias however

considered that Shahidulla was too distant"²⁹. On 12 May 1890 Younghusband formulated the policy which was to lead to the offer of the Macdonald Line in 1899. He stated, "The Chinese have occupied Shahidulla and have settled the question in a way which the Government of India will think the most advantageous to us. Our best policy would be to encourage the Chinese to effectively occupy all the country upto (1) the watershed of the Pamirs between the two branches of the Oxus, and (2) the main Karakoram or Muztagh Range which forms the Indus watershed"³⁰

The Russians had been making further advances in the Pamirs. The Chinese needed to be encouraged to come further into the area south of the Kuen-Lun Range. Once again Younghusband was deputed to visit the area. Before leaving he recorded a detailed memorandum on "the Russian Threat", as he called it. He wrote, "In their former occupation of Turkestan which ended in 1863 the Chinese considered the Kuen-Lun mountains (that is, the branch of them over which are the Kilian and Sanju passes) as their frontier, and according to Mr. Elias, Shahidulla was occupied by the Kashmiris nearly ever since they had conquered Ladakh (1842). When Yakub Beg came into power he advanced his frontier and the Kashmiris retired from Shahidulla in 1865. The Chinese have always had *Karawals* (frontier posts) on the northern side of the Kilian and Sanju passes, though the Kirghiz who occupy Shahidulla and the valley of the Karakash river have paid taxes to the Chinese. In 1885 they were told that they must not expect protection (against Kanjoots) as they lived beyond the frontier posts"³¹.

Younghusband was accompanied by Macartnay on this visit to Kashgar in 1891. Macartnay was from now on to be the eyes and ears of the British, as regards Sinkiang, just as Petrovsky was for the Russians, and remained so till 1903. While Petrovsky exercised power and inspired fear, the position of Macartnay was fragile in the face of the opposition of Petrovsky. To the *Tao Tai* Younghusband expressed the views of the Viceroy that the Chinese should advance and occupy the Trans-Kuen-Lun territory. The *Tao Tai* was however mindful of the presence of Petrovsky. Nevertheless he allowed Younghusband to proceed to Sarikol and the Pamir frontier. When Younghusband reached the Pamirs, the Russians who were watching stepped in and Ianov forced him to sign a paper that he was on their territory unauthorisedly and that for his return he would not use any of the twenty-one passes named in the paper he was made to sign.

The British got their revenge in Hunza which they invaded in 1891. This checked the Russian advance. Both sides had reached stalemate. An understanding was reached in 1893 leaving a tongue of territory of the Wakhan as a part of Afghanistan to act as a buffer between Russia and India. Thus the British were content to have eliminated the threat of Russian advance on the west. In 1896 Macartnay who was again on his way to Sinkiang crossed over by the Karakoram Pass route. His route diary written in his own hand is available in the National Archives. It shows that the Chinese had taken advantage of the advice of Younghusband and set up Chinese posts south of the Kuen-Lun. Apart from the Karakoram Pass where they had put up a stone marking it as their boundary, Macartnay notes that Suget Karaul south of the Suget Pass was the first place of human habitation on the north sides of the Karakoram Pass, and that a Chinese officer "resided there during the trading season but had no troops".³² Next came* Shadulla Fort and then the Sanju Pass and the Kilian Pass. The first Chinese official that Macartnay reported was posted at Kilian Pass.

At Kashgar Macartnay was busy with the question of pressing the claim of Hunza to rights in the Raksam Valley. The question seemed likely to be settled in favour of Hunza at the local level but though the Kunjoots were allowed to cultivate areas in the Raksam, the local authorities of Sinkiang suddenly received orders not to proceed with the transfer of the land in question formally. This change was due to Russian opposition and in 1899 Macartnay informed the Indian Government that "the Governor of the New Dominion had instructed the local authorities of defer the conveyance of Raksam to the Kanjutis".³³ It was learnt that this was due to the fear that the Russians might as a retaliation advance on Tashkurgan and Sarikol which adjoin the Russian Pamirs.

IV

Curzon the new Viceroy in 1899 had first hand knowledge about the Oxus region. He had travelled by the Russian railway line to the Caspian sea and from there visited the Central Asian Khanates and the source region of the Oxus river. When he became Viceroy he noted, "It is rather a fine balance of considerations for while on the one hand it is desirable to get the Kunjootis into Raksam in order to keep the Russians out, on the other hand should the latter seize Kashgar, they can claim Hunza as a subject state".³⁴ He therefore decided that a settlement should be reached with China over Hunza

* Where Shahidulla is spelt Shadulla—in contemporary records, the spelling has been left unchanged.

by surrendering the valid claims of Hunza over Raksam. As the matter developed, the Chinese were also offered part of Aksai Chin in the east in the line proposed in 1899.

The background to Hunza's claim was that China had a shadowy claim of overlordship over it which Hunza did not entirely denounce because it suited Hunza in order to "play the Chinese card" against the British and the Maharaja of Kashmir, and partly because the claims of Hunza to Raksam Valley and also to a part of the Taghdumbash Pamir was not opposed by China. In the interest of an overall settlement with China, Curzon decided to recommend to the Home Government a frontier line between India and China (in Sinkiang). This line was proposed to Peking by Macdonald the British Minister there on 18 March 1899 in a letter to the Chinese Foreign Office. This letter refers to the need to define the boundary between Hunza and China and suggested that "China should relinquish her shadowy claim over Kanjut. The Indian Government on the other hand would on behalf of Kanjut relinquish her claims to most of the Taghdumbash Pamir and Raksam districts".³⁵

The Foreign Office at London had written to Sir C Macdonald at Peking on December 14, 1898, "As a means of inducing China to renounce the claim to sovereignty over Hunza, the Government of India are ready to waive the claim of Hunza to the Taghdumbash (with the exception of a small portion) and also to Raksam. The line now proposed would form a good and well defined boundary and I have to request you to apprise the Tsungli Yamen (i.e., the Chinese Foreign Office) on the subject with a view to obtaining settlement of the question in the direction indicated by the Government of India".³⁶

The letter that Macdonald wrote to the T-Sungli Yamen on 14 March 1899 is worth quoting in full, on the subject of the boundary between the Indian State of Kashmir and the New Dominion of Chinese Turkestan. It ran, "It appears that the boundaries of the State of Kanjut with China have never been clearly defined. The Kanjutis claim an extensive tract of land in the Taghdumbash Pamir, extending as far north as Tashkunghan, and they also claim the district known as Raksam to the South of Sarikol. The right of Kanjut over part of the Taghdumbash Pamir were admitted by the *Tao Tai* of Kashgar in a letter to the Mir of Hunza dated February 1896 and last year the question of Raksam district was the subject of

negotiations between Kanjut and the official of the New Dominion in which the latter admitted that some of the Raksam land should be given to the Kanjutis.

"It is now proposed by the Indian Government that for the sake of avoiding any dispute or uncertainty in the future, a clear understanding should be come to as to the frontier between the two States—that China should relinquish her shadowy claim to suzerainty over Kanjut. The Indian Government on the other hand will on behalf of Kanjut relinquish her claims to most of the Taghdumbash Pamir and Raksam districts.

"It will not be necessary to mark out the frontier. The natural frontier is the crest of a range of mighty mountains, a great part of which is quite inaccessible. It will be sufficient if the two Governments enter into an agreement to recognise the frontier as laid down by its clearly marked geographical features. The line proposed by the Indian Government is briefly as follows: It may be seen by reference to the map of the Russo-Chinese frontier brought by the late Minister Hung Chun from St Petersburg and in possession of the Yamen.

Commencing on the little Pamir from the point at which the Anglo-Russian boundary Commission of 1895 completed their work, it runs south-east crossing the Karachikar stream at Mintaka Aghazi, then proceeding in the same direction, it joins at the Karchenai Pass the crest of the main ridge of the Muztagh range. It follows this to the south, passing by the Khunjerab Pass and continues southward to the peak just north of the Shimshal Pass. At this point the boundary leaves the crest and follows a spur running approximately parallel to the road from the Shimshal to the Hunza post at Darwaza. The line turning south through the post crosses the road at that point, and then ascends the nearest high spur and rejoins the main crests and follows them passing the Muzlagh, Gusherbrun, Saltoro Passes by the Karakoram. From the Karakoram Pass the crests of the range run east for about half a degree (100 I) and then turn south to a little below the 35th parallel of north latitude.

"Rounding then what in our maps is shown as the source of the Karakash, the line of hills to be followed run northeast to a point east of Kizil Jilga and from there in a south easterly direction follows the Lak Tsung range until that meets the spur running south from the Kuen-Lun range, which has hitherto been shown on our maps as the eastern boundary of Ladakh. This is a little east of 80°E longitude."³⁷

The letter made out case for a bargain in the north west, but also gave away Aksai Chin in the north east for no reason. This is what baffled Sir Lous Dane when he came upon the matter in 1907 as Foreign Secretary. In the meanwhile there was no response from the Chinese, and so the position remained as before.

V

The Chinese presence in Tibet was bolstered by the British invasion of 1904 and the subsequent settlement. The Russian Government agreed to demarcate the respective sphere of influence of themselves and the British in Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet by the Anglo Russian Convention of 1907 which was conveyed *post facto* to the Chinese. This recognised the British presence in Tibet and the Suzerainty of China over Tibet." The Chinese felt that under this umbrella they could now make inroads into Tibetan territory. The Government of India reported in July 1907 that "it is to the interest of China to reduce the area of Tibet and this they appear to be doing rather rapidly".³⁸ They received reports "which supply strong evidence of the fact that the Chinese are ambitious of making Tibet into a Chinese province". Their information was derived from the Nepalese representatives at Peking and at hasa which was passed on to them by the Prime Minister of Nepal. Captain O'Connor, an old Tibet hand had also received information from Tibet that "the Chinese troops had over run several districts of Eastern Tibet". Explaining all this to the Viceroy, Sir Louis Dane the Foreign Secretary noted on 26 July 1907, "Before the restoration of Chinese authority after the Tibet mission (i.e. the Younghusband invasion) Tibet was almost entirely autonomous and may easily become so again. It is therefore to the interest of China to reduce the area of Tibet as much as possible, though such a course hardly seems consistant with our interests."³⁹ As O'Connor had reported, as early as May 1905 the Chinese had appointed a new Commissioner of the Frontier, and in 1907 they passed an imperial order declaring Tibet to be a province of China.

Therefore it was attempted to ascertain from China as to what they considered to be the boundaries between themselves and Tibet. The reply from the British Minister at Peking in July 1907 was not forthcoming. Jordan the Minister reported, "In a private conversation with Tang today, the question of the boundary of Tibet was touched upon and views of the Government of India mentioned. He (Tang) was ignorant of the boundaries of Tibet on the north and east, but said that the Board concerned would be consulted". In February

he added, "Tang applied to the President of the Board concerned who was unable to supply any information and said Chinese Government possessed no maps later than the 18th Century."⁴⁰

The Chinese attitude was similar to that displayed by them in 1846 when Cunnighan and other boundary commissioners tried to ascertain their views regarding the boundary with Ladakh, and again in 1899 when the Indian authorities proposed a boundary with Sinkiang. But the question of the boundary between India and China came up indirectly before Sir Louis Dane when he was asked to confirm the boundaries to be shown on the new map of India at the scale of 32 miles to an inch which the Survey of India had prepared.

In 1907, the Surveyor General prepared a new map of India on the scale 1" to 32 miles and sent it to the Foreign Department. It was noted in March 1907 in the Foreign Department that 'no definite boundary can be shown for the British districts of the Punjab and UP bordering on Tibet. The external limits of Kashmir, Rampur, Bushahr and Tehri are also undefined.'⁴¹ On 25 March the Foreign Secretary Sir Louis Dane looked at the proposed map and said 'The colour wash in Kashmir is I think wrong. I am almost sure that Kashmir runs up to the Karakoram, leaving Shahidula as the first Kashgar post. Thence the boundary runs along to the Kun-Lun and Lingzi Thang is Kashmir and Aksai Chin is doubtful, but the western half might well be coloured yellow. Please see the Times Atlas map herewith (Map 83-4). Any account of the Leh-Kashgar route will show where the boundary is, and Deasey's journey may give further information.'⁴²

On this the department prepared a background note dated 30 March and quoted the boundary that was communicated to the Chinese in 1899. It was pointed out that it excluded Aksai Chin. "On the other hand, the note went on, "the map of Turkestan prepared in 1893 shows the whole of western Aksai Chin as excluded from Chinese control. The situation in Aksai Chin is summarised in Mr Stapleton's note of 8 January 1897. This shows that while Kashmir has some claim to part of the Aksai Chin, its claim has never been verified or defined. Colonel Strahan however noting on 8 Feb. 1897 mentioned the two Aksai Chins, as being one in China and one in Kashmir".

The note could not explain why Aksai Chin had been excluded from Kashmir when the 1899 line was offered. It went on, "Such

being the position, it is not clear why only a year later, we deliberately fixed the boundary so as to exclude the Aksai Chin from Kashmir, although in 1899 in criticising the colouring of the map of India, it was decided that the colour had been carried too far to the north near the Kun-Lun range and should be made fainter for an inch or so south of the limit shown. This may have led to the total disappearance of colour from the area in question, while in the map prepared for Secretary, the colour has further shrunk so as to exclude even the Lingzi Tang plains from Kashmir". (One wonders whether this is the clue to the exclusion of Aksai Chin altogether by the Macdonald Line!)

The note goes on, "As there is a certain amount of evidence, though of ancient date of Kashmir's claim to the western Aksai Chin, we shall perhaps have some justification for extending the colour wash over all this area up to the Kun Lun Range on the north and as far to east as is shown on the old map of Turkestan, i.e. upto the range dipping first southeast and then southwest, then southeast again from the Kun-Lun."⁴³

The masterful hand of Younghusband again came into play to determine the map of Kashmir. He was at this time Resident in Kashmir and Sir Louis, daunted perhaps by the formidable reputation of Younghusband, referred the matter to him. Younghusband drew his own line on the map and returned it in May 1907. The noting shows that Younghusband's suggestions accorded with the boundary indicated to China except in the neighbourhood of the Aksai Chin. "Here we have defined the boundary going northeast to a point east of Kizil Jilga and then southeast along the Lak Tsung Range, while Younghusband makes it run due east after rounding the source of the Kara Kash river."⁴⁴

Younghusband was asked why. His reply made it clear that he had made up his mind in 1890-91 to let the Chinese take up the defence of this area. He now replied, "I marked the boundary on the NE of Kashmir east of the Karakoram Pass according to what appeared to be the watershed. The whole country is absolute desert..... and not a single Kashmir subject lives there to have jurisdiction over". This was an echo of his earlier opinion that while Kashmir had a better claim over Shadulla, the Chinese had a better claim over the Kirghiz living there.

In June 1907, a further historical note was prepared by Mr. Kirpatrick who had prepared the background note already quoted. Accordidg to this, "Prior to 1895 the boundary was entirely undefined but we advised the Kashmir Durbar against occupying Shadulla, as Chinese suzerainty on the Karakash Valley was an established fact. In 1886 Captain Ramsay, Joint Commissioner Ladakh drew attention to the vagueness of the boundary. He showed that the 6th edition of the Map of Turkistan showed Aktagh (midway between Shahidula and the Karakoram Pass) as the border while the British Mission to Yarkand was escorted as far as Shahidula where it was met by Yarkand Officials". The note goes on, "The Proposal to fix the boundary at Shahidulla was revived in 1888 when Sir Mortimer Durand express the opinion (which was confirmed by the Viceroy, Dufferin) that it would not be desirable to run the risk of a troublesome controversy with China to push a Kashmir post beyond the Karakoram with the object of forestalling Russia when she succeeds the Chinese in Yarkand."⁴⁵

Thus forceful personalities like Younghusband and Durand determined the frontier of Kashmir in the north in the imperial interest. Dane was very disappointed. "It seems clear that in 1888 we renounced claims which we might have sustained, owing to the desire to placate China which existed then in connection with the Burma business", he noted. Dane seems to have been quite exasperated and noted on 18th October 1907, "What on earth induced Sir W. Cunningham to recommend this boundary I cannot tell, but it was recommended by the Government of India and I agree with it". He also added, "We hope to be able to keep Aksai Chin in Tibet in order to adhere to the Kun Lun boundary for that country".

Dane was a "trier". He again asked Younghusband that as one of the officers was going to Yarkand he might look and see if there was evidence of the limits of Chinese jurisdiction. Fielding, the officer in question did so and Younghusband reported, "The first settled inhabitants (Kirghiz) he appears to have met were at Suget and you will see from the enclosed extract of his letter dated 5.8.1907 that the Beg of Suget considered himself under Chinese jurisdiction". That is near Shahidula the writ of China ran in 1907. Thus the last word was with Younghusband and it showed that Aksai Chin was in 1907 well outside the jurisdiction of China.

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Organisation of Sales of Lethal and Non-Lethal Stores

MAJOR GENERAL B D KAPUR (RETD)*

ALL international sales have a specialised technique and even varies in application from country to country. In early sixties it took the Americans a good part of four years to enter the German market in a big way, and the British soon realised that to sell in America, they would have to adopt a new type of salesmanship. And when it comes to marketing and sales of armament and even non-lethal stores, they require an altogether different approach.

India's entry into the world market for the export of armaments, therefore, needs a special examination. This is not the normal run-of-the-mill business which any Government Officer may attempt to undertake; some have indeed done very well by finding the Clients for India but their achievements pale into insignificance compared to what other countries, same as our production potential, have achieved. Atleast in the initial stages the business has to be left to those who have had direct experience in handling the same internationally and have international contacts established in this business, whose support they can rely upon. In this brief article some guidelines are suggested for organising India's Exports in this specialised commodity.

EXPERIENCE OF OTHER COUNTRIES

With the availability of large dumps of lethal and non-lethal stores located in the various theatres after World War II (some still not exhausted), dealers grew up, some of whom acquired shiploads and transported them to their own warehouses. We also brought large

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The writer was the first Indian Director of Weapons and Equipment after independence from 1951 to 1954, when he proposed a modernisation plan to the Government, this led to a number of missions overseas for the purchase of armaments and fighting vehicles from France, Britain and the USA; later the development of TANK came under his purview. As the first Chief Controller of Defence R&D, he got involved in the promotion of major defence projects. In the last 20 years that he has been overseas, initially he was engaged by foreign firms as their Consultant for marketing and later, although involved in the development of industries, except for one armament project, he continued his academic interest in the development of the armament industry in Europe.

quantities of wireless sets and spares for the vehicles including some of the fighting vehicles. Initially the armament stocks were, however, kept under the strict control of the Government concerned. But the Dealers soon found a way for selling to unfriendly countries through third ports; the profit margins in this business were too enormous to mention.

Certain countries such as West Germany, France, Switzerland and the USA had accepted intermediaries to dispose off these stocks. The added reason was that the manufacturers of most of these lethal stores were private firms. Even though the French Government always had its own organisation for sales, it permitted Agents to negotiate the prices against other foreign bids.

In the last two decades, the East European countries, particularly Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia have brought out modern commercial brochures and distributed them to their accredited agents in the Western countries.

Only Britain is different from others. The reason is obvious: in the past the British armament industry had subsisted on meeting the requirements of India and other commonwealth countries. Although some of the Commonwealth countries, like India, had developed their own armoury, others in Africa continue to rely on British supplies.

In order to give a spurt to the export of defence material in non-established markets, Britain appointed "SUPER SALESMAN", businessmen with distinguished industrial careers, to organise the machinery for exports and to create new markets. Last year a major change came about with the appointment of an ex-IBM Business Executive as the Chief of Sales of the Royal Ordnance Factories, which are to be *reorganised under the Company Law as a commercial set up*. Before even the laws were enacted, the Chief Salesman and his team got out on international tours selling their wares to the United States of America and attending armament exhibitions such as the one held in ATHENS. At the same time, they proposed joint ventures with foreign arms manufacturers in items of British specialisation.

Starting in 1560 as a gun powder factory, the ordnance factories have gone through major expansion programmes and management changes. Unlike our ordnance factories, which do NOT reveal their revenue and expenditure, they took a commercial turn a few years ago declaring *profit and loss*. The trading profit made in 1983 was £ 66 million; Ammunition, which contributed the maximum to revenues,

sold for £ 480 million. Whilst we may also add some dynamism to our foreign sales, we should also review the management of our ordnance factories.

MARKET AREAS

Whereas generally speaking the whole world is open to competitive offers of suitable conventional armaments, the new countries particularly those that do not have an armament industry fully developed, offer markets which are growing rife with demands. Among the countries that come up with large and sporadic demands are : Central America, Latin America and Africa. With more and more self-reliance on security, regular demands also emanate from : Middle East, Gulf Area, Indonesia, Malaysia and even the West Indies.

In most of these countries "DASH" or "kick back", as the expressions are used, have become openly common. Even governments, traditionally conservative in such matters, have turned a blind eye to such practices. Hence the employment of intermediary agents even when government-to-government deals are undertaken, has become inevitable.

INDIA'S GAINS BY ENTERING THE EXPORT MARKET IN A MAJOR WAY

Few countries in the world realise the armament manufacturing potential of India and the pace at which defence technology has advanced in this country. One reason for this is the lack of encouragement to the private sector for making defence equipment. By exhibiting to the world its arsenals of modern armaments not only its potential strength will get known but also new markets would build up for sales.

Among the advantages India would gain by entering the world market by liberalising exports would be :

- a) A better ability to negotiate for its own requirements. In off-the-record talks overseas, I was told that our negotiating mechanics for purchases was still like those of "amateurs". We not only dilla-dally in decision-making but pay a higher price in spite of the large number of evaluation missions we send abroad for these deals.
- b) Modern Governments depend on cross-sales. By this means they are able to acquire new weapon systems concurrently disposing off the existing stocks, may be to a third country.
- c) There have been occasions when Britain has held back supplies to their own Forces in order to retain foreign markets.

By building world-wide markets obsolete and obsolescent equipment could also be disposed off. The sale proceeds of such equipment normally go into a "New Measures Budget" to modernise the Forces, a very essential consideration with the expanding budgets of our Forces.

India has continued to hoard large stocks of non-usable materials in the Ordnance depots. A large inventory of non-lethal stores should be got rid off; the complete personal gear of the soldier and the ancillary equipment such as tentage and engineering equipment.

From Writer's knowledge, the following weapons which have been indigenously developed could be offered for exports: Ishapore Rifle and ammunition, sub-machine gun, .303 riddle and ammunition (outdated but still used in some countries), anti-tank grenade, anti-tank mines, packhow gun etc. This list could be updated by Experts from the three Services.

MECHANICS OF SALES

In organising sales machinery, the following points should be borne in mind :

- a) A separate budget of foreign expenditure may be earmarked for samples, demonstrations and trials overseas.
- b) A brochure printed with photographs of major items and a DATA sheet. This is a very important document and needs attention of Experts for its preparation as a basis for catching the eye of the foreigner.
- c) Speed of communications is most essential : cables and telexes giving quotations, delivery schedules and prices (and other information required by the Buyer) are the only effective means of sales in the modern world. Standard printed contracts, with additions to be filled in separately for each contract, should be the end documents. Slow and laborious procedures will be ineffective in finalising deals; the competitor would have an edge on us.
- d) Packaging of materials for exports, particularly the lethal stores, must adhere to standard regulations laid down such as adopted by the British as sea-worthy or air-worthy.

TYPES OF DEALS FOR ARMAMENT SALES

In executing an armament deal, various methods are adopted :

a) *Government-to-Government*

In this case the deals are exclusively between Governments concerned with the inevitable dilatory procedures. These are now-a-

days only possible when top dignatories are visiting the countries concerned. India has good experience in this regard with Russia. Britain has managed quite a few deals this way recently.

b) Government-to-Government, but contacts for sales established through armament dealers

Here the details of supply, price and delivery are finalised through the Agent, who get an agreed commission. The contractual formalities are completed by the Governments concerned.

c) Minimum price quoted to Dealer

In this case the Agent is allowed to put on his commission at his own initiative and has the latitude to outbid the competitors. The sale is effected through the Agent.

CONCLUSION

If the Government policy allows, the Defence Ministry should set up an office for a SALESMAN as the Chief Executive for all foreign sales; the Chief Executive would have the authority to negotiate sales of defence materials and to seek markets, arrange for demonstrations etc. without consultations, acting within the guidelines approved by the Ministry and the Government.

Perhaps entertaining the services of someone, who has experience and background to set up the requisite mechanics and to create the world markets, having toured round the world, may be a quicker way for India to get into the field. India has all the commodities available provided the sale points are established. And to achieve this, special measures will have to be accepted, some unconventional and some non-bureaucratic.

Simplicity—The Principle of Administration

COLONEL O P KHANNA

IT was Hindenburg who said that "As in war so in life only the simple succeeds". As it is life in all its constituents is becoming complex day by day and solution to all the problems lies not in making them more complicated but in making them as simple as possible. Simplicity is the principle of administration. Of all the principles of administration this principle is least understood and mostly misapplied. It is by far the most effective principle which gives a definite edge to the success of any administrative system. Most of the problems that we are confronted with today in the administration of our units and also that of the administration of the country are due to the simple fact that we have gone in for complex solutions to simple problems rather than the simple solution to complex problems. Why only in administration, it has also been the principal aim of all sciences both physical and metaphysical to find out the solution in the simplest possible manner to the problems which are complex in nature. It may be remembered that the Newton's Laws and the theory of Relativity were borne out of the most simple mathematical equations. Even today scientists are trying to find out the unified theory of the origin of all the forces that are prevalent in nature. They are so strongly convinced that there ought to be a common origin of all the forces that they are spending their time, energy and money to reach such a solution. In nature it is always the simple and matter of fact solution to the complex problems that will succeed and not the complex solution.

Administration is a very complex function. It covers all facets of life. It involves coordination of the processes of manufacture, distribution and marketing, transportation and positioning the stocks where they are required. The solution to the administrative problems lies in the foresight and the ability to visualise the problems that are going to arise. Administration does not consist of finding the solution to the problems that have arisen. Administration is the art of foreseeing what problems are going to arise in future and therefore to evolve the remedial procedures and infrastructure to

solve them. In other words good administration is the ability to create an infrastructure for the solution of the problems that are going to arise in future. Therefore, it will be obvious that a good amount of foresight is required to be able to visualise what lies in future. Not only that since administration involves co-ordination of various activities and visualising the needs of human being which by themselves are complex in nature and therefore, finding the solution which are complex will make the problems more complex and thus resulting in failure. Administration deals with human lives; it satisfies the needs of the human beings for the tasks in hand and therefore it is a live science. It is not a jugglery of words or figures and therefore since it deals with human lives and all facets of life as such it is necessary that solution of these problems must be found in the simplest possible and matter of fact way. Administration is a function of command and usually should have as such importance as tactics or strategy. Administration can bring you to a war but cannot fight for which the other functions of command that is the tactics or strategy take over. Administration is not the end result but a means to something bigger which lies in another field. It may be waging the war or better law and order machinery or better realisation of taxes, but in all such aims of any operation the crucial factor is the quality of administration to achieve the above. If so, it is to give such an edge to this quality of administration that we must insist upon with its procedures, priorities, techniques, processes etc should all be as simple as possible. It invariably is the experience of administrators that moment you go in for complex solutions you find that half the battle has already been lost. It is because of the fact that complex solutions are difficult to be executed and more so by simple man of limited horizons. Therefore, it is essential that simple solutions be found to all the administrative problems so that they are capable of execution and also can give you the desired results thus giving you the success which is so much required in administration to achieve the desired aim.

SIMPLICITY IN APPROACH

It is not only necessary that the solution should be simple but it is also necessary that you approach a problem in the most simple fashion or rather in a matter of fact way. Every problem should be viewed in its essential ingredients. Every problem should be torn as under into its component parts, analysed and the simplest possible solution found to answer all the problems.

During second world war in Burma operations, the biggest logistics problem was the poor state of communications. The railways consisted of only one metre gauge line with ferry crossings on river Brahmaputra and there were hardly any roads existing and whatsoever were existing were in a very poor shape. Obviously to wage war and win it over a length of period running into years the first priority was to construct and improve the road communications. The problem was identified but then for construction of roads of the magnitude it would require an abundant supply of stones needed for foundation work for the roads. Unfortunately, in the plains of Assam no stones were available so the solution had to be found to this problem. A very simple solution was thus reached in which it was designed to construct brick kilns after every three miles stage and thus bricks produced would yield sufficient foundation material to be laid in lieu of stones so that the roads could be constructed in a short time. The roads were thus constructed and it is to the ingenuity of such simple solution that the war was waged and won despite many handicaps not excluding that of the communications. The problem was complex but the solution was simple and the approach to the problem was in a very matter of fact way.

It is a famous saying that in Army Headquarters no decisions are taken and if any decisions are taken, they are so complex that they cannot be put into execution. Invariable excuse put up as such at higher Headquarters is that sufficient data is not available. Invariably, the data is asked for from the lower formations and when received, gives rise to many other doubts and these doubts require a few more months if not years to sort out the problem. The strongest part of the whole episode is that invariably this data is available in the files of Army Headquarters but with lack of spirit to solve problem, the files are not searched and onus is shifted to lower formation Headquarters and with the passage of time the solution is delayed and nature has its own way of sorting out the problems which it does in such cases. After a few months you would find that either the problem has been forgotten or the problem does not exist because the nature has solved it. Finding no solution is not the simplest solution.

It is generally a habit with some of our decision makers to over generalise the solution to all the problems. A decision maker may have a bias to a particular solution under circumstances of which the decision maker was the best judge but it must be remembered that though the problems may be similar but the circumstances will

certainly vary and the solution to one of such problems at an earlier date may not be a solution to the problem at hand. Therefore, over-generalisation is as bad as not learning from the history of the past experience. In all such decisions another factor that must be considered is the complex nature of the human beings for all the problems are involved with the catering of the needs of the human beings who form a complex part of the organisation. Therefore, the solution must be simple and appealing to the ordinary men and should be in full consonance with the human psyche. The experience of running a good Officers Mess is certainly not a creditable experience to base your decisions in fighting the battle and thus cannot become a substitute for decision making for the battle being fought. The experience utilised in decision making must be similar or of the same variety. Therefore, a simplistic approach does by no means imply over generalisation.

A simplistic approach would mean a judicious balance to be kept between the delegation and the over centralisation. Whereas over centralisation may be required in case of a situation where policy decision making is required but it will be a bad thing if it is extended to the executive and directional level. It is at the directional and the executive level that de-centralisation and full delegation should be exploited so that a proper balance between the two facets of decision making is achieved, and therefore, in the net result simple solutions to complex problems are discovered and implemented. In the Army administration we come across so many cases of over centralisation which results into solutions being provided by the higher formations which could have been reached at a such lower level. Not only that the solutions thus reached by the higher formations are invariably extravagant and cannot be executed upon.

In the Armed Forces it was felt by the commanders that the number of accidents of vehicles is very large and it should be reduced. If that was the problem the simple approach to solve this problem should have been to enhance the quality of driving in the Armed Forces. But no such solution was found by the Formation Headquarters and in their eagerness to solve such a problem they took resort to complex solutions by which the running of the transport was so much centralised that the transport did not run at all. Orders were issued that no accident will be acceptable to higher commanders and if accident takes place the Commanding Officer will be marched up to the Formation Commanders. During night and for single vehicles it was the Commanding Officer who were required to sign

their duty slip. This was nothing but over centralisation and not the right solution to the problem. At no stage it was even remotely suggested by the higher Formation Headquarters to run a few more cadres or to organise the mechanical transport driving training in a more forceful way in the units. Instead of this simplistic approach to the problem solving, the commanders took resort to over centralisation which resulted in creating of a climate where no Commanding Officer would take a risk for fear of his being sealed for further promotion in running of their vehicles. The only result was that there were few vehicles on the road and when one vehicle was required to do the job, the second vehicle was also sent. In the absence of running of vehicles the training also suffered and what should have been the solution was not at all achieved and yet its reverse came to be true. It is one of the examples where a simple solution to the problem is disregarded and complex solutions are evolved due to the lack of a simplistic approach and in turn harms the organisation in its long range perspective. The simplicity is being sacrificed at the altar of overcentralisation.

In the last decade or two we have seen that the paper work has increased to unmanageable levels. At last when the officers and units cannot cope up with it, incorrect returns are invariably submitted and later corrected. Obviously under these circumstances the Headquarters calling for such information would very much like to ensure that the information submitted by the units is correct. Therefore, an ingenious staff officer at such Headquarters also started asking for a written certificate by the officer's Commanding units signed by them purporting to the correctness of the return. The decision makers did not take into account that the Officer Commanding units cannot check each and every data. Why for that matter he cannot check even a few returns that he submits? To check even one return in its entirety will mean a labour of at least a few hours if not days and the Commanding Officer is not a man who has all the free time to himself and in due course, no body nor even the Commanding Officer will bother much to sign the certificate blindly. It was this ingredient of the human psyche which was not taken into consideration by these authorities asking for a certificate signed by the Commanding Officer. After due course the certificates continued to be signed by the Commanding Officers without their verifying the actual contents and the strongest part of the certificate was that it was never even cursorily seen by the authorities asking for the returns. A good Commanding Officer started sending the returns with a certificate that all the data involved in the return was false and incorrect but still it continued to be

processed by the authorities concerned. The point here to note is that the solution of the problem of the incorrectness of the contents could have been overcome by measures like reducing the paper work, lesser number of returns etc but instead the solution was found to be in terms of a certificate by the Commanding Officer. This was no solution to the inherent problem because it was a complex solution of the problem which was against the tenets of simplicity and also against the terms of human psyche.

Simplicity as a principle of administration means not only that the solution should be simple but also the approach to such a solution should also be simple and should also be capable of execution. It is a common sight to see lofty solutions being sought to problems that invariably are not capable of being executed by simple men. What use are these lofty solutions when they cannot be put into action and cannot achieve anything. Take the case of the procedure laid down for issue of fuel to the vehicles. Every time a vehicle is supposed to get back from duty, its tank is supposed to be filled up not only to know how much fuel has been consumed but also to issue the requisite amount of fuel. It is easy to lay down such complex procedures but it is difficult to be executed upon. All administrative systems have a way of finding out the easiest solution to such problems. Now in the above case also precisely the same thing has happened in that when the vehicles come back from duty it is seen as to how much Kilometrage it has done, not necessary from the speedometers which is more often than not non functional, but from the distance charts made out in manuscript by units themselves, which give out the distance in Kilometres from units to various destinations. For all practical purposes the Kilometre per litre is generally taken to be 73% of the authorised and the figure when divides the distance gives the fuel consumed. In practice, it is not possible to top up all the vehicles after duty every day though laid down procedures demand so. This procedure is also followed by all transportation agencies whether private or Government transport undertakings. The question that comes up is that why should such procedures be laid down which in practice cannot be acted upon. In other words why complicate matters. Naturally people and organisations have a way of finding out simpler methods in spite of the laid down procedures and have always acted upon such simple resultant methods.

Take another case regarding structure of organisations. The second and the third line transport of the Army is meant to convey stores and materials from rear areas to the points of consumption.

Since 1906 when the Mechanical Transport was introduced, the authorisation of the number of vehicles in a platoon which is the basic sub unit continued to remain at 33 which included three spare vehicles and 30 load carriers. Now what was the purpose of these three spare vehicles is not known but the word "spare" obviously meant that if the regular load carriers become off road it is the spare vehicles which take their place during the course of convey duty. For the last seventy years or so this organisation had been existing as such but on ground no such spare vehicles were ever seen working in their designated role. These vehicles were more often than not used as the unit administrative vehicles or provided only a cushion to unit transport. Obviously the designated aim for keeping these vehicles in the authorised establishment was never fulfilled due to the simple reason that it was not capable of being fulfilled. If a simplistic approach would have been applied to this problem they would have been authorised only 30 load carriers and no spare vehicles as these vehicles served no purpose. How can any organisation keep 1/10th of its fleet spare and not running, for it would cost the exchequer a fat sum. Of course after 70 years of the existence of spare vehicles they were dispensed with. Was it not a case of mutilated and complicated approach to a very simple problem of infrastructure engineering ?

We are seeing and we continue to witness a strange phenomena taking place which in the long run creates a bad image for the Army in the eyes of the public. This is due to the fact that we had not gone for a simple solution taking into consideration the overall interest of the Army as well as the country. The National Cadet Corps was introduced some 30 years back and the main aim of the creation of this organisation was to instil a sense of discipline amongst the school and college boys and make them better citizens. Now the responsibility for officering this organisation was given to the Armed Forces. Therefore, it was a good lateral outlet which could absorb some of our officers and ease the pressure on the promotion prospects. However, with a very narrow outlook and perverted views we tried to send officers who had no future in the Army or were disgruntled due to having been superseded or those officers who were not wanted in the units were sent to man various posts in the National Cadet Corps. Similar was the case with the JCOs and NCOs posted to this organisation. Obviously, it resulted into weakening of the organisation and not achieving its goal. It is a fact of life that for any organisation to succeed it should have a reasonable intermingling of good and not so good officers. It has generally been the feeling which still persists to some extent that any body who is posted to the National Cadet Corps

is considered to have reached his coiling. Not only that no other organisation where we have sent our officers on deputation we have made it a point that we only send the officers who are not fit for further promotion, on the wrong plea that the best officers are required to man the Armed Forces. Like the Army the other organisations too require a good share of good officers and they ought to have been provided to them. The result of this policy of sending not so competent people to the National Cadet Corps and other organisations have been that those organisations have been ruined besides lowering the prestige of the Army in the eyes of public. The esteem of the Army in its inability to provide good leadership to these organisations has fallen. The obvious simple solution in this regard ought to have been that one who is sent to the National Cadet Corps should also be fit enough to be retained in the Army and no discrimination in this regard should have been accepted by our top military leadership but reverse is the case. It was deliberately arranged and grounds were generated for only incompetent officers being sent to such organisations. If so we are reaping the fruits of our efforts in not applying simplistic solution to the problems at hand. This problem would not have arisen if we would have thought of the well being of these organisations at the same level as we had thought of the Army. If the problems was to man these organisations we would have manned them well by sending suitable officers and our efficiency would have been discernible in the eyes of the public. Crores of rupees have been wasted by not following a simple solution in that it is necessary to staff the organisation with competent people. IAS and IPS have been deputing people for administrative functions outside their service and they have been sending their officers who are as good or bad as the officers manning the parent organisation.

SIMPLICITY IN PROCEDURE

This by far is possibly the major reason for the mal administration prevalent in the country both in the Armed Forces and outside. A good administration will basically depend upon the simplest possible procedures. The moment you make the procedures complicated nothing will be achieved and nothing useful will result despite your best efforts. Today the Army Officers with two decades of service or more cannot fill up their income tax forms because they are so complicated. What use are those forms when they cannot be processed properly by a common layman. They give rise to mistakes and mal practices. Today a stage has reached when even an honest officer who wants to pay his taxes cannot do so because the processes involved are so complicated that he will more

often than not shy away from it. If the income tax authorities have deducted 60 rupees extra than your justified income tax it is better to forget about it than to reclaim the money for the procedures are so complex that even after ten years you are not likely to get that money back. Today if you want to pay your road tax honestly you will have to stand in a queue in bright sunshine for at least seven days at a time and even after that there is no surety that you would have paid your taxes. The reason is simple. It is the complexity of the procedures which stimulate the non-observance of the rules. It is a matter of irony that even in judicial proceedings it will take generations to get a decision from the Court by which time the original party would in all likelihood have passed away from the face of the earth. If by honest means you want to get a duplicate copy of the application from the Court registrar it will take you years. This is because of the complexity of procedures which more often than not have degraded administration to a stagnant standstill.

Nearer home in the Army you find that the non availability state of the Ordnance Service is as high as 22 percent whereas you never hear the ASC supplies being not available. If it is studied in a deeper perspective it will be found that the ordnance procedures are so complex that even to issue an item of daily necessity like soap etc will take a minimum of one to two months provided the stocks are available which is usually not the case. In the ordnance service there are 49 manuals dealing with the issue procedures of various items and it takes for an officer almost a life time to read and digest the same to enable him to issue stores from the Ordnance Depot by which time he is about to retire. Is it not the height of complexity? Take the case of ASC Supply Depot which have only two manuals. The indent issue procedures are absolutely so simple that a pre-receipted indent is placed on the authority on which the stocks are issued. It is because of this simplicity that the ASC supplies have never failed whereas the Ordnance has never succeeded. The more complex solution you evolve of a problem lesser chances you will have to solve the problem and satisfy the consumers.

The ammunition in the battle zone is issued by the ASC and the issue procedure is so simple that the stocks are issued on a manuscript demand on the reverse of a message pad and therefore such a simple procedure has never failed. The consumer is not required to indent or plan or forecast the requirements which is all the responsibility of the issuing service. But if you devise a procedure where the indent will have to be counter-signed by three authorities, vetted by the fourth, audited by the fifth, processed by the sixth

and issued by the seventh you will find the stocks will never be issued. Therefore, the essence of problem solving lies in the fact that the solution evolved should be as simple as possible. It is a matter of common knowledge at CDA (Officers) that the Army officers do not claim their authorised TA/DA for all types of duties. The Government is saving millions of rupees because the officers do not know their entitlements. Why don't they know their entitlement is because of the fact that the TA/DA rules are so complex that an ordinary human being will not be able to understand the same. And even if some body tries to understand it will take him years and that too at the cost of his official allotted duties.

No wonder that even Brigadiers and Generals rather forego their entitlements than be in a position to claim what is theirs. Is that not all due to the fact that the rules made are so complex that they cannot be followed? Why can't simpler method be devised for claiming the TA/DA entitlements? The complexity of the solution evolved is the very root cause of the failure of the solution itself.

Take another case of the local purchase of supplies and other items. The statutory rules lay down that there should be three quotations. Even when a board of officers consisting of three upright and honest men go to the market to get the rates of any item and after having obtained such rates they are required to be certified by the marketing officer of that station. Incidentally, the rank of the marketing officer is not more than possibly a senior NCO or junior JCO but then he has the over riding powers whereas our three honest and upright officers getting the local market rates are not trusted till the marketing officer certifies. What are we achieving by laying down this plethora of rules based upon the inherent suspicion of our own officers. The story does not end here. Even after obtaining the market rates and the certificate of the marketing officer the rates are required to be approved by the Station Commander or the Officer Commanding unit and the purchases cannot be made by paying in cash. It only means we are adding more complications to an already complicated solution and therefore it is obvious that no officer and less of the organisations whether units or formations like to go and do their duty of doing the local purchase where the constraints are so many and the procedures so complex. They would rather go without the items than to be involved in such complications. Not only that the organisations and the men manning these organisations have a tendency to short circuit the official laid down complicated procedures. In this case also the same is happening and it is invariably

the unit bania who will provide you with three quotations as well as the certificate of the marketing officer and the stores which can be paid by cheque. Thus the stores so purchased though of inferior quality, satisfy the complications of the procedure but the spirit behind these procedures is the honest purchases is lost due to its complexity. Many have taken up this business of supplying to the Army the stores on payment by cheques and short circuiting the above complicated procedures. Obviously, the above will indicate that any complicated solution is no solution at all. If you want to do a thing or you want to have the efficiency in administration please go in for the simplest possible procedure. It is a well known fact that the present administration is known by the name of Permit Raj. Obviously what is important is to be able to get the permit or some thing or the other which is a ready money which can generate high profits and one knows that to obtain permits one has to go through very complex procedures and so does the administration. These days in the civil trade and industry they are employing specialists as liaison officers who have the knowledge of complexity of the laid down procedures and who can liaise with the authorities concerned in not many ethical ways and obtain the necessary permits for the sponsors who pay for it.

A few years back there were reports in the Press that most of our semi skilled and skilled labourers like masons, brick layers, carpenters etc engaged in Arabian countries were not happy with the administration that they were not being reimbursed with enough payment. The Engineers India Limited, the employing agency came out with the facts and figures that these labourers besides being given a certain pay packet were being also provided with U Foam mattresses, air conditioned accommodation and possibly highly expensive western food. If so one may ask the employing agency as to the reason for providing these amenities at the cost of their pay packet, which no worker wanted and certainly they were not used to it. For a mason, it is more important to get Rs. 200.00 extra in lieu of getting an air conditioned accommodation. While laying down the scales of pay the simple solution of this problem of reimbursement would have been to get them better pay scales rather than amenities which neither they were used to nor they wanted. Is it not finding out deliberately a complex solution to a simple problem, by giving them perks they don't want and paying them less which they want more. The principle of simplicity has been completely done away with by the Engineers India Ltd. in this regard.

SIMPLICITY IN TECHNIQUES

Another field in which simplicity is of utmost importance is in the field of techniques and methods where the operation of administrative procedures could be simplified, which will consequently result in larger efficiency and give an edge to the quality of the logistics support. It may be mentioned here that whether it is trade or industry or the Armed Forces, the techniques of operation in any field must be made as simple as possible. It includes the techniques of manufacture or techniques of marketing or techniques of processing which are as much applicable to Armed Forces as they are to the trade or industry. Simplicity would therefore imply to have the minimum number of stages and all the stages should be as simple as possible. We have plenty of examples from the Armed Forces. It is a matter of fact that in the Army vehicles there is generally no conductor as it is in the civil buses etc. Therefore, it appears that once a senior officer could not over-take a military vehicle because a man sitting in the rear of the vehicle could not communicate with the driver to enable him to tell the driver to give a pass to the rear vehicle. This yielded now what is called famous 'danda man' and in some formations it has been seen that the orders exist that one other rank will always travel in the rear of the vehicle and a contraption known as a 'danda' is attached to the vehicle body. When the man sitting in the body of the vehicle sees a vehicle wanting to overtake, he beats the body of the vehicle with the 'danda' which it is presumed will give an indication to the driver to enable him to give the pass to the rear vehicle. The procedure is as complicated as possible. This technique is based upon the promise that first of all a man should be available in the body of the vehicles which generally is not the case with vehicle carrying other than transients and also that beating the body with the 'danda' is a sure way of communication with the driver. It is obvious that both the premises are wrong and therefore the 'danda' technique has never been a success. The obvious solution would have been to provide functional rear view mirrors which is an item of equipment and never in short supply. Obviously simplicity is the answer in providing what is required but we are famous for our short cuts.

Take another case of the authorisation of Officers' Messes. There can be no two opinions on the question of the necessity of Officers' Messes. It is very much required not only in the Armed Forces but also for the industry where they are known in a different form as Officers Club. But even when it is provided as an institution in any

industry it is worth noting that it exists with all its necessary staff, buildings, accessories etc. Whereas in the Armed Forces wherever the Officers Messes are authorised, only a building is earmarked or constructed and staffing is left to the mercy of the officers of that unit. It is a matter of common sense and simplistic approach that if you have a mess it should also have the cooks, waiters, masalchies and others. If so, asking the officers to pay for such establishment will only result in most cases the manpower to be found from the unit concerned or to go without some of them which will result in lesser efficiency etc. So in both cases you will find the administration will suffer. The simplistic approach to the problem would have been to provide what is required and not to be penny-wise and pound-foolish where a building costing lacs of rupees can be provided but a recurrent expenditure of a few hundred rupees is not provided on the plea of economy. These half hearted measures do not go with the simplicity approach.

As per the travelling allowance rules an officer is required to come to his office and go back to the residence once a day in his own transport and for all other duties he is required to be provided with the transport. Generally in no organisation whether civil or military the transport will be available in such abundance that it will suffice for all officers and other ranks duties. To overcome this problem in civil organisations they have authorised what is known as conveyance allowance. So has the Army done too. But the problem in the Army is that there are so many riders claim these conveyance allowances and that it is so complicated that not even one percent of the officers know that it can be claimed. If an officer goes from his office for inspection of lines or for that matter inspection of his unit cook houses, he is very much authorised for transport and if not available he can claim the cost of transportation if he uses his own scooter or car. It is a matter of wonder that hardly any officer has done that and the reason is the complexity of the technique of furnishing a claim on that ground. By no stress of imagination it should be said that an officer should not go to inspect his command. But what should have been done was to make these rules as simple as possible to ensure that the officers claim their dues. In other words the techniques of claiming the just dues should have been made simple. But to the detriment of the officers and the organisation the rules have been made complicated. Of course it saves a lot of money etc but at the cost of the officers and the efficiency of the organisation.

It is a matter of general experience in the Armed Forces that whenever a communication is originated at highest level for mass circulation, sufficient copies are not forwarded to the consumer units. Even Army orders and Army instructions are not received in sufficient numbers. Even literature meant for mass circulation like 'Bast Chest' etc are not received in such quantities that it can be distributed to the units in the required quantity. It has deep repercussions in that a letter originated from the Army Headquarters for mass circulation and information is first reproduced by cyclostyling or typing at Command Headquarters then at Area/Division, then at Sub Area/-Brigade level and then at the unit level. The point to note here is that duplication by way of cyclostyling at every level requires much efforts in terms of typing work, correction work and the cost of paper etc and also the whole information is delayed considerably as it has been reduplicated at every level. It is waste of effort, money and resources and also results in delayed information which may be of no use by the time it reaches the units. The answer to this problem would have been a very simple device by which the requisite number of copies are printed once and for all at the Ministry of Defence or the Army Headquarters level and passed on to all concerned. But this due course has not been adopted because either the requisite stationary is not available or the lethargy and inertia at the level of the Army Headquarters. Simplicity will pay you handsome dividends if you take recourse to it. Complexity will defeat the very goal of organisations.

SIMPLICITY IN PROCESSING

It is a matter of common knowledge that the number of reports and returns originated by unit are not required by the higher Formation Headquarters or Army Headquarters. In most cases the data that is asked for has no value, is not processed and is not made use of anywhere. As per Druckers, the best course of action in such situations would be to stop all reports and returns of the whole organisation for say a period of three months or so and to start only those reports and returns which are specifically asked for by the higher Headquarters during this period of inaction. If such solution is made applicable to the Army, it will result into the death and stoppage of at least 75 percent of the paper work which is done at the unit level and is not required by the higher Headquarters. Such unnecessary reports like certificate that morale of the unit is alright or that all security arrangements

have been undertaken or even such returns which give the details of summary punishments etc continue to be sent to higher Headquarters which in any case do not see the light of the day. In other words the processing of at least 75 percent of the reports and returns is just not required and if so they are unnecessary. Therefore, the simplicity of processing should indicate that where processing is not required the returns should not be originated but we continue to live with all these plethora of reports and returns which are not required to be processed at all. Simplicity would indicate that these reports should be done away with but it takes the mind of a giant to execute this.

Army has an organisation known as Stationery Depots which provide stationery to the consuming units. Also from time immemorial Armed Forces have instituted certain forms like message form, receipt and issue voucher etc which would reduce the paper work to the minimum since all headings and necessary details would already be found printed in such forms and may not be required to be rewritten. This is a very commendable approach as it would simplify the processing and the data that you require would be available in the forms. However, over the years the situation has changed. The stationery is in short supply and invariably 80 percent of the forms that you ask for will not be available. Now if the forms are not available you will type them on a paper and when you do that the paper would become a short supply item. Since the consumption of these items is not uniform, you will find in the units that certain forms are available in plenty whereas certain other forms are not available. When you start using ordinary paper in lieu of these forms, ordinary paper becomes a short supply item, then obviously the clerks would start typing their requirements on reverse of these forms which are available in plenty. It is a common sight now to see official letters being typed on the reverse of message forms and other stationery. It is a waste of those forms which have been specifically printed for a particular job as the same forms are not being used for the right job. A very simple solution to the problem would have been to make available the stationery and the forms in its requisite quantity so that no waste takes place of the printed forms and the printed forms are utilised for the purpose they are meant for.

Take another case; a large number of allowances and entitlements are laid down in monetary terms for officers and Other Ranks like condiment allowance, education training grant, hair washing allowance etc. Now in the present circumstances what is happening

is every time the value of money goes down which is happening quite frequently and rapidly, the cases are put up by the Army Headquarters to increase the scales compatible with their prices in the market. After all what is the aim of condiment allowance is to provide sufficient condiments to make the food palatable for the other Ranks. If over two years the prices have increased by 20 percent it obviously means that jawans are getting 20 percent, less of condiments and therefore the palatability of food is reduced to that an extent. With the inflation rate in an around 10 percent, it is obvious that the increase in prices of almost all the commodities will vary to that an extent for the year. An Other Rank gets Train Journey Ration Allowance and if one goes into the history of that allowance it will be revealing to know that it has been revised in the last twenty years at least six to seven times. Every time an effort is made to bring the amount of train journey ration allowance compatible with the prices of the food items then immediately thereafter the man cannot get the same food in the same allowances allowed by the Government. He has to suffer for another two to three years before it is revised again and again brought at par with the market rates. What does that mean? It obviously places the consumer at a disadvantage. A simple solution to this problem would have been to allow the rise in cost on per capita basis linked to the rise in prices in the open market. In other words all these allowances which are directly linked to the market rates should be compatible with the availability in the market and also should be increased as per the inflation rate and suitable guidelines should be laid down to work out this rise and allow this expenditure accordingly. Simplicity is the essence of good administration and the loss of it will directly affect the quality of logistics support.

Take another case; to-day for all emergency issues by Supply Depots we ask the units to get the indents countersigned by the Station Commander. Similarly for payment to the individual not borne on the strength of the unit, he is required to get station order published to that effect. Even for such minor things like issue of railway warrants and form 'D' the officer is required to get a station order published for his attachment to a unit which issues the above. There are hoardes of such unnecessary procedures that we go in for solution of problems which in any case would have been solved in the most ordinary way. What is the requirement of the station order or attachment orders in all the above eventualities is not known and also they are certainly not required. An Officer Commanding Supply Depot is a competent person to

recognise and appreciate the difficulties of the units as and when they arise and should be able to issue rations on as required basis. Similarly the Station Commander is not in a position to verify the antecedents of an officer before he requests for attachment to another unit for issue of railway warrants etc. Similarly, a jawan asking for pay from a different unit can be easily given his entitlement after having worked it out from his pay book. The respective station orders of attachment achieve nothing and therefore are unnecessary. If so, they are certainly not required. The dictates of simplicity will compell that all such unnecessary rituals be done away with for they make the execution of the logistic set up so much more complicated and it certainly does degrade the efficiency of the system also.

Some time back free rations were authorised to the officers of the rank of colonels and below. Recently Brigadiers have also been authorised free rations. What is the logical reason for not allowing Major Generals and above the free rations when their number runs into a few hundred. Not only that, of two hundred odd Major Generals and above in the Army should not be discriminated and besides it would not cost such to the Government in issuing the rations to such officers. The simplicity of the system should dictate that there should be few rules as possible and the rules should be applied without any discrimination which is not the case in the present situation. The system should be made so simplified that to the extent possible there should not be any exception and Major Generals and above have been made an exception in the present case.

Take the case of the LTC. The rules for the LTC are so complex that first of all it takes years to know what your entitlement is and what supporting documents are required to prefer a claim. This obviously makes the things more complex and therefore most of the younger officers prefer not to claim. Recently the mileage for LTC has been fixed as 1465 kilometres as the optimum mileage for which the claim can be preferred. This has been increased from earlier 965 kilometres. If the intention of the Government is to give this perk then the simpler course would be to authorise a certain amount of money every year or every two years to be given to all soldiers including officers based upon the rank. This will make the thing simpler. It will reduce considerable paper work and the efforts involved. Everybody would know what their entitlement is besides it will also ensure that no unethical or unhealthy practices are resorted to by way of obtaining bogus tickets etc for the above as is the case in most of the civil establishments where the LTC claims are mostly

bogus. This would achieve at one stroke the simplicity desired in the system and also will kill unethical practices. It will make the budgeting easier for the Government. Obviously if the intention is to evolve a better system, the simplicity is the answer. More complicated system you evolve more difficult it will be to execute. The story does not end here. If one may ask why should a limit of 1465 kilometres be laid down? Is it to discriminate against those who come from distant areas like officers and troops from south serving in the northern borders or troops from western sides serving in Nefa and Nagaland. If not why lay down a limit of 1465 kilometres and why not allow the entitled categories the fare of the entitled class from home town to the places of duty and back irrespective of the distance? The extra expenditure will be hardly any but the system will be simple and capable of execution and save in terms of effort and paper work.

Another case that can be illustrated is the pension scheme. The basic idea behind pension is to provide security to the Government servant in his old age. Now if one asks as to security for whom? It is obviously for the man and his family. Certain States of India have instituted a process under which the pension entitled to a Government servant is given to him or to his wife whosoever dies later. In other words if the husband is a Government servant and he dies earlier than the wife then wife continues to get the pension till her demise. This is an excellent way of providing the security and the case analyses will show that it does not involve any large scale expenditure. The reasons are obvious. The average life span of a man is more than a woman and in most cases it is the wife who will pre decess. In that case the expenditure will be as per the existing regulations. The cases where wife lives longer than the husband will be few and this extra expenditure will certainly generate a great deal of confidence and security amongst the Government servants. In other words by spending something extra you will get handsome dividends. In any case the Army is giving the family pension and it will amount to a marginal increase in the pension for those wives whose husbands have pre-deceased them. Such a system will be simpler, better and satisfactory to the entitled categories. In other words a system should be evolved based on human values and that it should be made as simple as possible.

CONCLUSION

What has been discussed above will simply indicate that simplicity is the answer to all the problems of mal-administration. Where the

administration has not given the desired standard for the underlying cause, if searched, will come out to be the lack of simplicity in the system itself. Today there are such plethoras of rules and regulations that the administrators are lost in their cob-webs. For efficient administration the rules should be as few as possible and they should be capable of execution. In other words this should be as simple as possible. Simplicity is the soul of administration. If today travelling by the railway, paying your income tax and other taxes, getting anything through bureaucracy is not possible, it is because of the simple fact that every thing concerned with such aspects of administration is so complicated that nothing worthwhile results. Good administration can be ruined by making the approach to the problems, the procedures, the techniques and the processing difficult. It is only the simple that succeeds in life as in war.

TACSATs—The Impact of Tactical Statellites on Warfare at Sea

CAPTAIN MADHVENDRA SINGH, IN

SINCE time immemorial man has been restricted to a two dimensional, horizontal view of the earth, particularly at sea which is an unending flat plain. However, he has always been fascinated by the vertical or bird's eye view and towards this end has always sought the highest ground around him, whether it was the lookout atop the crow's nest of a ship or Chatrapati Shivaji looking for a suitable location for his many hill top fortresses.

This fascination with the vertical view has spurred man to try and fly like a bird. Daedalus and his son Icarus are reputed to have built wings of wax and feathers so that they could fly to the sun. The history of man's miming of birds extends from the imaginative sketches of Leonardo Da Vinci (1500 AD) to experiments of such inventive men as Sir George Cayley and Otto Lilienthal. However, it was the Wright Brothers who fulfilled man's long cherished dream of flying a heavier than air machine.

As often happens with new inventions, no one then realised the profound impact that man's ability to fly would have on warfare in the future. In fact, in July 1909 Popular Mechanics wrote :

"Wilbur wright has stated that in his opinion the use of the aeroplane for dropping bombs or explosives into a hostile army is impracticable as the machines must rise to 1000 to 1500 feet above ground to escape shell fire. At that height accuracy would be impossible in dropping explosives when moving at 40 or 50 miles per hour. He believes that their only use in war will be as scouts and messengers."

He could not possibly have foreseen the exponential manner in which technology would make man fly higher and faster than he could ever have visualised. "Take the high ground" has been one of the

oldest maxims of land warfare. Today it has acquired a new meaning and is equally applicable to warfare at sea.

Without a doubt, today's high ground is space. Just as the military use of air evolved during World War II and subsequent wars, the military use of space has been evolving over the past two decades and during the rest of this century, will be refined to the point where predominance in space will be a decisive factor in future wars. This will be particularly so at sea which presents a flat unchanging background when viewed from space, unlike the varied background on

Victory through space power is the new war cry of the two leading space powers, the USA and USSR, both of whom are spending billions of dollars on new techniques of space warfare, all of which use satellites as their platform. The aim of this essay is to make Service officers aware of the satellite era that lies ahead. The essay briefly discusses the various types of satellites that are likely to be in orbit by the end of the century, their impact on warfare at sea, how they can be countered and the course that India should follow in its space effort.

Types of Satellites

Spy satellites take many forms and disguises but fall into four main categories of electronic intelligence (ferrets), photo/IR/radar reconnaissance, surveillance and early warning. The difference between reconnaissance and surveillance satellites has mostly to do with the constancy of their coverage. Generally surveillance satellites provide around the clock coverage of especially interesting regions, operation singly from very high, stationary orbit or in sets of several satellites that orbit in trail at lower altitudes, one picking up where the other left off. Reconnaissance (Recce) Satellites on the other hand "fly by" and see what's happening.

Ferret Satellites : Perhaps the most mystifying of all military recce satellites, ferrets are packed with "electronic ears" that pick up electromagnetic signals—radio or radar—from the ground some few hundred kilometers below. These eavesdropping satellites were created for electronic espionage jobs that are difficult, dangerous or impossible for ships and aircraft. Within this decade, ferret satellites will be so sensitive that they will be able to pick up low power walkietalkie conversations between soldiers in the battle field and by the end of the century perhaps even weaker signals will be detectable.

Linked to computer centres ashore, these satellites will be able to provide an enormous amount of data to commanders at sea and on the battle field.

Photo Recce Satellites : To take close up photographs from far away requires a camera with a focal length of several meters. With a technique called "folded optics" it became possible to make such cameras which were only slightly larger than an ice bucket and thus made satellite photography feasible. Once the problem of shrinking the camera was solved the question of returning the images to earth still remained. This was solved first by sending back the film in a special re-entry capsule. However, this was too slow a process as there was considerable time-late between pictures being taken and their availability. Modern satellites of the KH-11 type transmit images to ground stations in "real time" with astonishing clarity.

Many photo recce and surveillance satellites now come equipped with "multi-spectral" scanners with which they can examine the same scene through different coloured glasses, particularly using IR and thermal imaging techniques. Thus they can spy out not only the obvious structures on the ground but to a great extent, the contents of those structures. While they cannot (as yet) see through missile sheds, bomber hangars or submarine pens, they can tell when something is in there and whether and how it is different from something that was in there before. Thus on a ship it will be possible to tell which missile tube/hangar has a missile and which does not. Between those tubes that have missiles it will be possible to tell which missile is ready or about to be fired because it will generate more heat as soon as it is put on power prior to firing.

Ocean Surveillance Satellites : It is absolutely vital to know where the enemy is. Searching the oceans was a hopeless task only a few decades ago but today ocean surveillance satellites watch the sea for anything that looks suspicious. If an unidentified submarine comes to the surface an orbiting eye will monitor it until it submerges. In the years to come perhaps satellites may use blue-green lasers or thermal techniques to detect submarines below the water as well.

Early Warning Satellites : These are designed specifically to give warning of the approach of hostile ballistic missiles and the latest ones can also detect the heat emitted by enemy bombers in the atmosphere. Today the US has at least three early warning satellites in sun-synchronous or geo-stationary orbit above the Equator. One hangs

over the Indian Ocean, its huge telescope rotating conically, covering Soviet and Chinese missile launches. The other two are positioned over Brazil and the Pacific to watch for submarine launched missiles. These work in concert with huge, phased array radar stations located in the Aleutians, Otis AFB Massachusetts and Beale AFB California as part of the USAF spacetrack system.

Navigation Satellites : Mariners have always needed to steer by the stars and satellite technology has now given them better "stars" to steer by. Take NAVSTAR satellites, more commonly referred to as global positioning systems (GPS) satellites. By 1980 the US had five in orbit and by 1985 the full complement of 18 satellites will be orbiting the earth every 12 hours in sets of six each, on three separate tracks. Wherever one may be on earth, there will be a few in the sky above, from horizon to horizon, at all times. Containing atomic clocks of accuracy down to a billionth of a second, these satellites will beam their positions constantly to suitably equipped soldiers, sailors and airmen or their vehicles or missiles in flight which can fix their positions to within 50 feet of absolute accuracy.

Military Communication Satellites : These are being used by many countries today and provide instantaneous world wide communications without breaking HF silence. The US, for example, has the Fleet Satellite Communications system which has four satellites in geosynchronous orbit 23000 miles high.

Weather Satellites : To steer the photo race satellites on courses that give them the clearest shots and to activate them when it counts, their remote controllers rely on information from military meteorological satellites. The US has two such satellites in near polar orbits which provide complete global coverage four times a day. Called "Block 5-D" satellites, they transmit their findings to shore stations which relay them to the Air Force global weather centre at SAC Headquarters in Nebraska.

Role of Satellites in Warfare at Sea

With rapid advances in microchip technology, man's imagination appears to be the only factor limiting widespread use of satellites for warfare at sea. The more important applications are discussed below. Some of them may seem farfetched today but that is because battle groups do not as yet have dedicated satellites available to them at all

times. Since a carrier Battle group costs billions of dollars it is very probable that another billion dollars or so will be spent when required to ensure that the battle group has dedicated satellites overhead to provide it all the information it needs in its area of influence. Perhaps these satellites will be operated from giant mother ships (the shuttle) which could refuel/requip/re-arm a satellite and position it whenever/wherever required by a battle group. Just as maritime forces have always wanted TAC ALR at sea, battle groups of the future will have TACSATs (Tactical Satellites) overhead for a variety of tasks.

Identification—In a multipolar world where ships of many nations ply the high seas it is essential that targets be positively identified before they are attacked. With increased ranges of weapon systems lack of positive identification precludes use of weapons at their maximum effective ranges. With satellites it will be possible to photograph a contact and relay it to suitably equipped ships at sea. The cameras/TV cameras in the satellites can be zoomed in on the contact to give real time, close up images thus facilitating identification of contacts hundreds of miles away. If photography is not possible due to light conditions the ship can be identified by its IR signature or its radio or radar signature.

Over-The-Horizon Targeting—Ships of the super-powers already have cruise missiles with ranges of a few hundred miles. However, over the horizon (OTH) targeting for such weapon required cooperating ships/aircraft which may or may not be available. Even if available the unit providing targeting data is vulnerable to enemy counter-action. With cooperating satellites it will be possible to know the exact position of the target with respect to the firing ship which can then launch its weapons at the target which may well be hundreds of miles away. To counter enemy evasive action during the missile time flight, as also to cater for unforeseen influences like wind, satellites of the future will be able to apply mid-course corrections to missiles in flight thus increasing their probability of hit.

ESM/ECM—ESM satellites which can detect and analyse radio/radar waves and relay the information to earth already exist. These will be refined in the years ahead and their information will become available to surface combatants on a real time basis. The big advantage of satellites is that e.m. waves travelling from a satellite to earth or vice versa traverse the earth's atmosphere for only a short distance. Their energy is, therefore, not so heavily dissipated. Thus great ranges

can be obtained with very little power making satellites good platforms for ECM such as noise or modulated jamming or deception techniques. ECM could therefore be used against enemy units and missiles in flight long before they become a threat to one's force.

Communications—Perhaps the one area where satellites have already had a profound impact in operations at sea is in the field of communications. Ships at sea seldom communicated with shore HQ for fear of giving away their positions on HF or MF.

Between units at sea VHF/UHF was limited to visual ranges. Thus once he left his base the Commanding Officer of a ship was expected to use plenty of initiative and was by and large left to his own devices except to be provided intelligence information from ashore. Control of widespread forces was difficult.

Today world wide, instantaneous and secure communications are possible on UHF via satellite. There being less risk of being located by direction finders, ships can keep in constant touch with shore headquarters as also with supporting units, no matter how far they may be. This has greatly improved the command and control of naval forces at sea, though it has taken away much of the independence and initiative of commanders at sea because shore HQ cannot resist exercising greater control of units at sea—an attitude that needs to be curbed if commanders at sea are expected to act with dash and daring.

Weather Watch—Even in today's push button warfare nature continues to be mightier than man. No matter how hard he tries it is not possible for man to change the laws of physics. Understand them he can; use them he can but change them he cannot. Thus IR detection and lasers are very adversely affected by high humidity and particularly by rain and clouds. Nor can a ship under a cloud be photographed by a satellite. Propagation conditions also vary with weather. And, of course, in high wind and heavy sea states operations at sea become very difficult. With weather satellites, a battle group commander gets advance warning of the weather developing around his force and can utilise the weather to his advantage.

Navigation—Knowing one's position has always been important, particularly in restricted waters. Traditionally, ships have fixed their position on the high seas by observing heavenly bodies. These observations took time and often were not possible due to overcast skies.

Today ships, aircraft and missiles in flight can accurately fix their position via satellites to within a few yards and keep it updated at all times.

Coordination of Massed Attacks—Splitting forces and attacking the enemy from different directions is a favoured tactic to confuse or saturate the defences. Without good and secure communications and position fixing systems, however, it was not possible to carry out a coordinated massed sector attack using widely dispersed forces. Today this is a feasible proposition and once the target has been selected and H—hour promulgated widely dispersed forces can use satellite communication, navigation and intelligence to manoeuvre and attack simultaneously.

Anti-Submarine Warfare—The submarine has always had an advantage over surface ships because of its ability to hide under millions of square miles of ocean. To cope with a submarine, coordinated ASW became the standard operating procedure with ships, aircraft and submarines working together to track and hunt down submarines. With the advent of SSBNs it became vital that both superpowers keep a track of each others submarines. Both have spent immense sums on ASW which is today spread across an immense spectrum of communications and spy satellites, under-water listening devices, attack submarine, patrol aircraft and surface ships. The first line of US ASW defence are the many spy satellites. They keep watch on Russian submarines in construction yards and their home ports. When one of the submarines slips out to sea, the satellites give the signal. Theirs is a difficult mission, given the almost constant cloud cover over those bases and yards. The need to see through the clouds, to keep constant watch was and is a major reason for the development of ever new generations of US rece and surveillance satellites of even more extraordinary sensory and communication skills.

In the days of dependence on film bucket drops of photographs the Soviet subs that showed up in the satellite shots were well out to sea by the time the film could be retrieved, processed and analysed. When the Soviets learned of the snap and send powers of the electronically pictorial KA 11, they quickly moved to cover up their submarine pens. Satellite mounted blue-green lasers may in the future be able to detect submarines under water. So also may thermal detectors on satellites because a nuclear submarine generates immense quantities of

heat and theoretically, this should be detectable by a sensitive thermal detector.

Anti-Satellite Measures

What can a country do if confronted by a power which has an array of satellites or one to which satellite intelligence is available from an ally? Obviously the first thing is to be aware of all the satellites deployed and their capabilities, limitations and tracks, then only can one plan counter measures. This is particularly important in the case of reconce satellites which have a limited angle of look and are overhead for a short time. If the period of orbit and track is known then a ship can take evasive action between orbits (Proceed at high speed at right angles to the satellite track as soon as satellite dips) or it may use cloud cover or smoke to mask itself during the few minutes that the satellite is overhead.

Movement of troops and units will increasingly have to be carried out under cover of darkness and deception measures taken during the day to foil reconce satellites. Perhaps entire operations could be conducted during the monsoons when a dense cloud cover blankets the whole sub-continent and large areas of ocean around it, thus making satellite reconnaissance ineffective.

Indian Defence Satellites

So far the Indian space effort has been a totally civilian effort with purely civilian application/uses. The Indian Armed Forces can ill afford to ignore the tremendous advantages of space based systems and it is time that our space effort cater for military applications in future. These need not be offensive in nature and nor should we try to achieve things which are beyond our reach/expertise. For the moment we should concentrate only on satellite communication and simple reconce satellites. The former will ensure effective command and control of our flung units and the latter will give us vital information about hostile units. Imagine knowing in advance the position of the enemy's fleet, or Armoured Divisions or Deep Penetration strike squadrons! To be forewarned is to be forearmed and reconce satellites over areas of our interest would forewarn our defence planners about the enemy's intentions.

Conclusion

Science has now moved warfare into the last remaining arena—outer

space. It had been hoped that space would be used only for peaceful purposes. Unfortunately this was not to be because of the immense military benefits that can accrue from satellite based systems. Space activities are coming more and more under military direction. This was already so in the USSR, but over the last few years funding for American military space projects has surpassed the budget for the civilian space effort and it is only a matter of time before the US Department of Defence controls NASA. The militarization of space will virtually effect the lives of everyone on earth and will change our world and certainly maritime warfare, irrevocably. The Fleets and Armies that have co-operating satellites overhead will have an overwhelming advantage over those that do not.

Forthrightness in the Army

COLONEL K KULDIP SINGH

INTRODUCTION

FORTHRIGHTNESS is an individual trait which impels one to give one's honest opinion unreservedly. It needs moral courage and strength of conviction to be forthright as, at times, it may be in the face of disfavour of one's superior officer. It is difficult to overstress the need to cultivate and encourage forthrightness in the Army; it deserves to be foremost in the cherished ethos of the service culture.

A healthy climate of 'free expression' (open communication) between the leader and the led encourages forthrightness. Lack of it makes forthrightness a hazard; as amongst the multitude of yesmen, the forthright gets singled out and more often earns wrath of the boss than admired. It is desirable to cultivate a temper of 'free expression' where the superior officer is eager to elicit communication from his subordinates and the latter feel free to give their opinion, without inhibition. Of course, such a freedom of expression is relevant only till the superior officer has given his decision. 'Free expression' in our context does not connote unchecked freedom of expression, enshrined in the Fundamental Rights of the Constitution; discretion and propriety in 'expression' are understandable which have been institutionalised in the Service Rules.

A lot is good in the Indian Army which one can be proud of. However, there is a need to keep a watch on the developing trends so that these do not lead us to a dismal situation. It may be undue being pessimist, but one does feel that unless we check certain unhealthy trends in time, the forthright may be rarer to find in the Service. It is sad to imagine the damages that the pliable yesmen and time-servers, if allowed to proliferate, can do to the professional tenor and ethos of an army. I feel, an earnest introspection (within Family) of the vital issues is warranted even in times of fair-going, lest we all should be held guilty of lacking forthrightness to point out what is wrong where.

I am aware, those in authority are fully seized of the problem areas and there is no lack of wanting the best in our service culture.

'Forthrightness' cannot be delinked from 'free expression'; therefore, to give due treatment to the subject, it is relevant to discuss these together. The scope of the paper includes free expression and forthrightness amongst officers and all ranks.

AIM

It is intended to mull-over forthrightness in the Army and suggest measures to preserve it in the service culture.

CLIMATE OF FREE EXPRESSION

PARTICIPATIVE INVOLVEMENT

Climate of free expression reflects health of an organisation, where an individual genuinely feels responsible and free to express himself. His pride in belonging to and concern for well-being of the organisation are too high to let a weakness and impropriety in the system or functioning go un-noticed and unchecked. Such open communication should not be misconstrued as looseness in discipline or lack of propriety.

It must be very dear to the soldier's heart to wish to share his views in the planning that goes in deciding issues which concern him. Such freedom of expression will give him a sense of participation and pride in what he does. The temper of leadership in a unit is of a high order where an OR can walk upto his CO, without hesitation, to give his suggestions on improvement of the unit administration or training.

The present day soldier has to be convinced about the rationale of his actions before he puts his heart and soul in it. Not enough thought seems to be given to involve all ranks in the formulation of plans. Notwithstanding the constraints of security to associate all ranks at the planning stage; surely, there are certain aspects where they can be intelligently involved. I know of a division commander, who had a day-long open and free-for-all discussion (Sand-model), attended by all officers of the division, before finalising his plans for a large scale exercise. After deciding the broad framework, another discussion was held where COs and above participated. Once the plans were finalised, a discussion for all officers of the division was again held to discuss

thread-bare conduct of the battle. By jove, when the battle was joined, there was a whole-hearted and confident participation by all ranks! Such a plan had to be a grand success.

UTILISATION OF POTENTIAL

Democratic values were an anathema to the service culture of pre-independence era where officers maintained distance from their men. The cult of officers of those days was to give orders and that of men to obey. Even among the officers, the junior were rarely heard. Today's soldier is a thinking man who wants to reason 'why' and 'how' of every action of his. It will be a folly to under-estimate his mental calibre. Ability to think and perform need not always be directly proportionate to one's rank and service.

It needs an art to discover and judiciously utilise the potential. Many able generals had started their career in the ranks. Hitler had fought the First World War as a corporal. History has recorded instances where sepoys led units to glorious victories. Naik Nagda led his unit to the famous victory over Hunza Nagar Fort in 1891 and was awarded IOM, the highest award to an Indian, then. It is amazing to see how some of the ex-servicemen (OR included) made a distinction even in professions like business & politics. I was pleasantly surprised recently to learn that my ex batman (Sahayak), who had left service about 10 years ago, was now an effective and popular MLA. He happened to meet my wife at a function (I was not present) and took pride in introducing himself 'main saab ka batman tha'. Soon he may be a minister. Surely, all the wisdom and maturity which he exudes now could not have dawned on him over-night after leaving the service.

VARIETY OF VIEWS

Two heads are always better than one. In our handling of complex problems, where stakes are high, it is essential to select the best possible course of action, which could well be unorthodox. A foreign student officer once told me his impressions about the Indian Army, "there are two differences which strike me ; firstly, you maintain a lot of distance between officers and the men ; secondly, in a section of my army, about 10 different courses will emerge to overcome a problem; but in your Army, I don't think the Section Commander has such a variety of suggested courses." How true the foreign friend was!

In our schools of instructions, grading consciousness is so high

amongst the students that those who get up to speak do so, not to contribute an idea but largely to impress how well they can speak. The purpose of such discussions (including discussions in formations) is to invite ideas and evolve tac doctrines; but, generally, these end up in some of the participants making a grade as speakers. Those who lack gift-of-the-gab prefer to desist from offering a new idea for fear of being shot-down in argument. In a discussion an off-beat alternative should be encouraged (even if it sounds wild) and originality rewarded.

UNWANTED GAPS

Absence of free expression generates the 'communication gap' not only between officers and the men but amongst the officers as well. When junior officers do not feel free to express their views, they often resort to the foul practice of back-biting and denigrating the system and the authorities. Such officers, who have no spine to give their point of view, suffer a 'credibility gap' with their men. Once the men know that their officer does not have courage to speak for them, he forfeits their credibility, and they choose to approach the higher commander directly. Thus, the 'communication' and 'credibility' gaps start eating into guts of the system like white ants.

FORTHRIGHTNESS

THE FORTHRIGHT

Men of moral courage and conviction do not hold back their honest points of view whatever be the working environment. It is these people—alas a small proportion—who sustain the culture of forthrightness. The forthright fights for justice, is not bashful about voicing his opinion, comes straight to the point, no shilly shallying; deviousness is foreign to him. He is easily misunderstood for being tactless and defying. He has to be lucky if someone sees through the spark and shores him out of the mess he might have landed himself in.

All 'good officers' do not make 'successful officers'. Perhaps, being good alone is not good enough. Rommel, Montgomery and Patton were lucky to make success despite their being forthright (and blunt). Such great leaders are cut for crisis situations. War brings up the capable and strong men; in peace they generally fall by the wayside. If *raison-d'être* of a soldier is to prepare for war, is it not vital for health of the Army culture that the strong and forthright men are protected during peace? Where else shall we look for them in times

of war? War also helps to identify men of mediocrity who rise to high positions, for qualifications other than professional. Unfortunately, experience of war is rare and does not come in everyone's life.

YESMAN

It is the easiest thing to be a yesman ; after all, to be a yesman, one needs only to nod his head to the tune of his boss. Sychophants and yesmen are popular side-kicks to hang around those who are themselves yesmen of a high order. To a rational (fortunately, we have many), sychophants and yesmen are an aversion, as he knows, they lack depth and self-confidence, easily change colours and turn hostile without remorse once their end is served. They make up in tact and conformity what they lack in courage and enterprise. Such people are dangerous as subordinates, colleagues and superiors. We need to identify the opportunist time-servers and prevent them from reaching places of importance where they do incalculable damages. Damages done by such people are irreparable particularly while they command troops. Let them rise to any higher rank, but such low grade officers should not be given command assignments.

THE CONFORMIST & OPPORTUNIST FLOAT UPWARDS

Paradoxically, a recipe for making success in the Army is given in the book 'Psychology of Military Incompetence', "stick to the rule book, do nothing without explicit approval of superior, conform, never offend superior, and you will float upwards." It is a satire on how things are in the British Army which should be taken note of while viewing things in our Army. Some of the unobtrusive indicators associated with the notion of good officers are commented upon in the book "Crises in Command", "Distrust an officer with perfect or near perfect record of efficiency reports, look carefully for a man with low marks in tact (he may be creative), a man with low marks in loyalty is likely to have an independent mind, trust a man who heads for sounds of the guns (has repeated tours of operational service), trust a man whose command performed well." Ironically, the characteristics denigrated above are the very qualities considered important for success. This view about the US Army is not irrelevant to things in our Army.

Any organisation runs by virtue of the presence of a few dedicated and forthright men. Their total absence can be disastrous. It is un-

reasonable to expect everyone in a set-up to be reformed or motivated for higher moral values. The forthright should be identified and protected by instituting adequate safeguards in our system against damages because of a 'clash of personality' with their superior officers—they should not become a casualty because of any weakness in the system.

TRUTH IS VITAL

Some argue that the manner of projecting a point is more important than the point itself. It may be true in the business parlance and other professions where salesmanship is key to success. However, in the profession of arms, where one may not get another chance to experiment truth, surely facts should matter the most. A truth remains a truth whatever be the manner in which it is projected. Let us encourage people to come out openly with their views, even to the point of being blunt, rather than holding back.

LOYALTY

Loyalty should not be used to blackmail one into silence when one is faced with incompetence, injustice and folly. Our loyalty is to the Nation, Organisation and to the superior, in that order or priority. To keep quite in face of injustice, irregularity and moral depredation is to lack moral courage.

Forthrightness should not be misconstrued as disobedience, defiance or insolence. The right to project one's point of view is only till the decision is taken. It does not undermine the authority of the superior officer as his will be the last word. Once the decision has been taken, the heart and soul of each and everyone must go in its execution.

ONE MISTAKE SYNDROME

Some believe that a bold and forthright junior officer generally becomes infirm and cautious as he advances in service and rank. If it is so, is it because of sobriety after long years of experience or decadence because of age or the higher ambition and stakes in higher echelons? Instead of blaming the officer, there is need to critically analyse the causes promoting the alleged degradation. Firstly, perhaps he lacks faith in fairness and strength of the system to safeguard interest of the forthright. Secondly, the 'one-mistake syndrome' makes a mouse of a man because, he knows, if he goes on the wrong side of a superior,

even once, he will never be able to live with it. Should we not do something to help him to keep his chin up ?

RECOMMENDATIONS

The difference between us and our glorious ancient lies not in human nature but in proliferation of skills. The principal human values, morality and forthrightness, will ever remain vital for any system or organisation. The Armed Forces have done the Nation, and us all in uniform, proud in times of crises. I have no doubt, we shall acquit ourselves creditably in any future challenges that come our way. To keep the flag high, we need to continue reminding ourselves of the absolute values for good health of our Army culture. Any unhealthy trend must be identified and checked in time. An attempt to push problems under the carpet can prove calamitous at a later stage.

It is a need of the hour that certain steps are taken to eliminate blocks coming in the way of forthrightness, to reassure the man in uniform about the fairness and strength of the system and to arouse his conscience to aim for higher values. I suggest the following measures for consideration of those in authority :—

- (a) Let a note of consciousness strike the minds of everyone in uniform that forthrightness, encouraged by a climate of free expression, is highly desirable to preserve in the Army. To this end, directives may be issued by senior commanders. It should be emphasised that dissent is a healthy part of a group discussion and that to disagree is not to be disloyal. Everyone has right to express his honest opinion; to accept the point or not is the prerogative of the superior officer.
- (b) It is for consideration to have a separate column in the ACR form to indicate an officer's penchant for forthrightness.
- (c) Though, by and large, the system protects the interest of officers, we could consider institution of more and adequate safeguards to eliminate 'one-mistake-syndrome', so that officer feels assured that 'clash of personality' with a superior officer shall not bring him to the end of the road.
- (d) Let there be special awards for originality in thought, enterprise and off-beat solutions to our professional problems.
- (e) We need to make a concerted effort to prevent creation of

'communication' and 'credibility' gaps amongst the officers and between the officers and the men. Need for more of 'participative leadership, is perhaps the call of the time. Of course, the style of leadership depends entirely on discretion of the leader.

(f) By the time an officer comes up for promotion to command a unit, his leadership potential should be identified. Low grade officers, even if approved for promotion, should not be given command of troops.

(g) It will be a good idea to entrust the subject to a select Study Group, for an indepth study, to define concrete measures to inculcate, preserve and encourage forthrightness in the Army. The scope of the Study should encompass, inter alia, leadership training imparted at various training institutes. Awareness of the need to inculcate forthrightness should be appreciated at the early stages of training at NDA, IMA & OTS; subsequent training at unit and various schools and colleges in the Army should encourage its growth. Factors like 'professional competence' and 'sense of security' have special relevance to induce forthrightness. All these and other aspects should be examined by the Study Group and modalities refined to achieve the desired results.

CONCLUSION

I have given expression to my views on the subject with a sincere hope of not being taken amiss. There is no novelty in what has been written or recommended. I am also aware that there are far more senior and responsible officers in the Army who are in a better position to perceive things and take remedial measures. Mine is only a *view point*. Understandably, the subject of forthrightness is dear to everyone's heart. Let us translate our concern into definite measures to uphold the glorious traditions of efficiency and preserve moral value of forthrightness in the Army culture.

Some Past Vignettes of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands

LIEUTENANT GENERAL S L MENEZES P V S M

THE name 'Andaman', according to the "Imperial Gazetteer" (1908), has been in historical times derived from 'Handuman', the Malay form of Hanuman, viewing the islands as the home of Hanuman. Owing to the ancient course of trade, the existence of the Andamans has been known from early times. Ptolemy's 'Agathou Daimonos Nesos' probably preserves a misunderstanding of some term applied by sailors to a place in or near to the modern Andamans.

In his "Memoirs" (Volume 3 from 1782) (1923 edition), William Hickey records, "Commodor Cornwallis, Commander in Chief of the British Squadron in the Eastern Seas and brother to the noble Governor General (Lord Cornwallis), though very unlike him both in person and manner, came to visit his Lordship. The Commodore was a living Truncheon, but more of a brute than Smollet made his hero. After a sojourn of three weeks in Calcutta, during which he abused or found fault with everybody and everything, he took his departure for a country better adapted to his rough temper and disposition, that is the Andamans,.....said to be inhabited by a race of anthropophagi or cannibals, described by some historians as being utterly incapable of civilization. Amongst these savage people did the valiant Commodore Cornwallisprefer living to that of a polished society of an English settlement. In common justice to him, however, let me add that in his apparently strange attachment he had a particular object in view, that of forming a colony upon the Grand Andaman, which islands were wellknown to abound with forest timber of a fine quality and prodigious size, equally well suited for ships or buildings. The Grand Andaman had also one of the noblest and most spacious harbours in the world. In consequence of Commodore Cornwallis' strong recommendationsrespecting the national advantages to be derived from securing a permanent footing upon the Andamans, the Government of Bengal at last resolved to establish a settlement upon at least one of them to execute which Major Alexander Kyd, an able Engineer

officer, with the requisite assistants, artificers, a body of troops and stores of every kind, were despatched from Fort William; fortifications were constructed, and other public buildings erected, everything going on as well as could be wished, when a stop was put to any further proceedings by order from England, the Company of Directors having come to a resolution that Penang.....should be the place for establishing a settlement upon; in which determination every man of science and capable of judging upon such a subject pronounced the Leadenhall folks wrong, their fiat however, being irrevocable, Commodore Cornwallis' favourite plan was abandoned, the works and buildings which had been constructed upon the Andamans were demolished, lest any other European power should land upon the island and be benefited from seeing such things ready prepared to fix themselves there; thus was an enormous sum of money absolutely thrown away."

The original English settlement at the Andamans, established by the Marine Surveyor Archibald Blair in 1789, was not a penal settlement. It was formed on the lines of several then in existence, e.g. at Penang, and Bencoolen (in Sumatra) then under the Indian Government to put down piracy and the murder of shipwrecked crews. Convicts from India were sent to help in development. They had been sent to Bencoolen in 1787, and afterwards to Penang in 1796, Malacca in 1824, Singapore in 1825, and later to Moulmein and the Tenasserim province of Burma. Blair's arrangements for establishing the settlement in what he first named Port Cornwallis (now Port Blair) were excellent, as were his selection of the site, and his surveys of parts of the coast, several of which continued in use decades later. The settlement flourished under Blair, but on the advice of Commodore Cornwallis, the site was changed for strategical reasons to the North-East Harbour, now Port Cornwallis, where it flourished first. Here it was under Colonel Alexander Kyd, a man of considerable resource. On the abandonment of Port Cornwallis in 1796, it contained 270 convicts and 550 free Bengali settlers. The Convicts were transferred to Penang, and the settlers taken back to Bengal. After that the Andamans remained unoccupied by the Indian Government till 1856, the Penal Settlement being formed two years later. On Ross Island were located Government House, the British barracks and the Indian infantry lines. The British barracks were known as Windsor Castle! A former British Commandant at this Windsor Castle, progressive in his ideas and interested in the preservation of old buildings, had in the last century asked the local authorities for a coat of whitewash

for Windsor Castle. He received a reply that, as there were only 12,400 convicts in the islands at that time, adequate labour was not available! Furthermore, the application for a coat of whitewash for Windsor Castle was considered unreasonable, because the settlement official concerned had been there for 37 years, and no such request had ever been made before.

Towards the latter half of the 19th century, the convicts in the Andamans, numbered about 12,000, included several hundred women. When any of them were released, they were allowed to marry, after due permission, and those who elected to settle in the Andamans were granted plots of land free. Marriage negotiations were held periodically under the Administration's supervision, a released male convict being at liberty to choose a wife from amongst those released at the same time from the female jail. There was obviously only limited selection possible, and one wonders which party struck the better bargain. The convicts were mostly from India, but included some Burmese, classified as 'dacoits', men who had taken up arms against the British during the Third Burmese War, and had gone on fighting when the campaign was officially declared to have ended.

An event of 1872 was the murder of Lord Mayo, the then Viceroy, who was stabbed to death by an escaped Pathan convict. This was an irony of fate as he had gone to the Andamans to seek to better conditions in the penal settlement. Now and again, inevitably, batches of convicts made the most daring attempts of escape. A successful one was a party of seven Burmese, who seized a boat and put out to sea in the midst of the monsoon. A strong westerly wind drove them in seven days to land near Mergui, whence they fled into the then Siam, and got back to Burma. A batch of Indian convicts, fired by this escape, was not so fortunate. Instead of seizing a boat, they made a raft, which travelled so slowly, that all but two died of thirst and the poor weak survivors were recaptured. The 'Imperial Gazetteer' (1908) gives the number of escaped and not recaptured as 24 in 1874, 15 in 1881, 14 in 1891, 5 in 1901, and 13 in 1905/6, most being presumed dead.

On, a certain occasion, one of the dreaded cyclones struck the 'Enterprise', a ship of the Indian Navy, and she foundered on the rocks near the 'female' jail. Many lives were lost, but several were saved by the female convicts improvising ropes with their clothing.

The then Government of India directed that tea should be grown

in the Andamans, but the soil did not suit the tea, and the tea did not suit anybody. It was very bitter, and gave the stomach such a fright that it caused strabismus. But besides making people crosseyed, it brought on shaking of the arms, and it is alleged that after a while some of the garrison were unable to salute without knocking off their helmets and pagris. The growing and consumption of Andaman tea was sequentially discontinued.

In the earliest known narrative of these islands the indigenous inhabitants were represented as cannibals of frightful aspect, with huge misshapen feet a cubit in length. They, however, were not cannibals, and their feet were of ordinary size and shapes. They probably preserve, in their persons and customs, owing to an indefinite period of complete isolation, the last pure remnant of the oldest race of man in existence. Like most other aboriginal tribes, they strongly objected to strangers, for their very good reasons. They did not want strangers to meddle with them, and their forcible resenting of intruders—even shipwrecked mariners led on occasions to fighting. The history of the South Wales Borderers showed that the Little Andaman Island was once the scene of an exploit, for which no less than five Victoria Crosses were awarded. The regimental history relates that, in 1867 a party of the regiment was sent from Port Blair to ascertain the fate of the captain and crew of the ship 'Assam Valley', who were reported to have landed on the Little Andaman in a storm, and to have been murdered there. In very difficult and heavy surf conditions, over a period of days, and after a cutter and a raft were washed away, with an officer of the 9th Bengal Infantry, a skull and four bodies were traced on the island amidst opposition of showers of arrows. This search party of 17 was now stranded without ammunition and faced certain death. Their extrication after three attempts led to the award of the five Victoria Crosses.

South of the Andamans, and separated from them by the Ten Degrees Channel, lie the Nicobar Islands. The Nicobar seem always to have been known as the 'Land of the Naked'. According to the 'Imperial Gazetteer, (1908) the islands were known in India as 'Nakkavar', which was anglicized to 'Nicobar'. Like the Andamans, the existence of the Nicobars has been known from the time of Ptolemy onwards, but unlike the Andamans, there was as long a history of European occupation as other parts of the Eastern seas. In the Nicobars there were Portuguese missionaries in the early Seventeenth century and probably much earlier. As early as 1688 Dampier records that two (probably

Jesuits) 'fryers' had previously been there. Next we have the letters of the French Jesuits, Faure and Taillandier, in 1711. In 1756, the Danes took possession of the islands to colonize, but employed the wrong class of men. The colony, affiliated to Tranquebar in South India, perished miserably by 1759. The Danes then invited the Moravian Brethren to try their hands at conversion and colonization. The Moravian (Herrnhuter) Mission lasted from 1768 to 1787. It did not flourish, and the Danish East India Company left their missionaries to a miserable fate. In 1778, by persuasion of an adventurous Ostender, William Bolts, the Austrians appeared, but their attempt failed after three years. Their presence offended the Danes, and from 1784 till 1807 they kept up a little guard in Nancowry Harbour. From 1807 to 1814 the islands were in British possession during the Napoleonic Wars, and were then handed back by treaty to the Danes. In 1835 French Jesuits arrived in Car Nicobar (where they had been 200 years previously), and, suffering great privation, remained till 1846. In 1846 took place the Danish scientific expedition in the 'Galathea', with a new and unhappy settlement scheme. In 1848 the Danes formally relinquished sovereignty, and finally removed all remains of their settlement. In 1858 the Austrian ship 'Novara' brought a scientific expedition and a scheme for settlement, which came to nothing. In 1867 Franz Maurer strongly advised the Prussian Government to take over the islands. In 1869, the British, after an amicable negotiation with the Danish, took formal possession, and established in Nancowry Harbour, subordinate to that at the Andamans, a Penal Settlement, which was however withdrawn in 1888, owing to the unhealthiness of the climate. The Andamans were considered worse.

Nancowry has an excellent harbour, which was also used by the Japanese in World War II, apart, of course, from using Port Blair as well. (The British Commissioner, Bird, who elected to stay behind with the people he administered in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands when they were occupied in early 1942 by the Japanese, was beheaded by the latter.)

The 'devil murders' of Car Nicobar were true ceremonial murders of men and women, and sometimes even of children, undertaken for the public benefit by a body of villagers, to get rid of a person considered dangerous or obnoxious to their community. But the root cause was always spirit possession and the victim was bad because he was considered possessed. The orthodox method was very cruel. The legs and

arms were broken or dislocated so that the victim could not fight. He was then strangled and his body sunk at sea.

The Nicobar Islands were famous for sea shells in a wonderful variety of shape, size, colour and beauty. In the last century, bartering for sea shells could be carried out in rum, or top hats, the tribal elders becoming addicted to this type of headdress after seeing some of the British wearing it on certain occasions. The tribal elder with the largest assortment of toppers chose to keep up with the times, and go by the name of 'Friend of England'!

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Air Chief P C Lal DFC—A Tribute

BRIGADIER N S RAWAT

ON 13th August '82 died in a London hospital, where he had gone for open heart surgery, retired Air Chief P C Lal of heart failure at a comparatively young age of 66 years.

Lal was born in Lahore in 1916. His father Mr. Basant Lal, one of the very few Indian Commissioners of Incometax those days, gave him the best education available and then sent him to U.K. for training in Journalism. During that time the 2nd World War broke out, and Britishers urged all youths to get enlisted in the Armed Forces. Any young person not doing so was jeered by the girls by throwing over him or her white feathers. This stung young Lal to the quick and he got enlisted into the Air Force. After completing his training in 1939 he was sent to Burma with his squadron which made a name for itself there. Lal earned a DFC for distinguished service. Even that time he was known to be a very steady officer dedicated to service. Naturally therefore such a coming Air Force Officer attracted the attention of JRD Tata—that great judge of human worth. He strongly recommended Lal (then an Air Cadre) to Pt. Nehru in 1956 as the General Manager for the newly integrated Air Lines.

Herein Lal was destined to play a dominating part and show his real worth despite the then Defence Minister Krishna Menon's allergy for Lal's masterly superb comparative statement of 'OREGON' the French Air Craft. This annoyed Menon no end. Where is the writer of this note, he fumed? When told that Lal was away on Extra Regimental duty with Air Lines, Menon thundered 'Let him remain there for keeps'.

Soon after taking over from Mr. Shanker Prasad, an eminent ICS, the then Chairman Indian Air Lines, Lal flew to Calcutta and interviewed a few officers. I happened to be one such. He said to me, I have a number of complaints from Air Corporation employees Union against your die hardism. They say you are an unduly strict disciplinarian, and that you wish to enforce army

discipline down their throats and they nick-name you 'HITLER'. That you just do not care for their union. I told him my charter was to enforce discipline amongst the employees of nine airlines forming the Air Lines. But should my work be not liked I can gladly go. I have already earned a pension from the army. Before long Lal started appreciating my work and supporting me. Within a year I was promoted Chief Admin officer at his HQ in Delhi. It verily was a pleasure working under that dynamic person till the end of my tenure in December 1960.

Lal was a votary for efficiency and hard work. He just could not tolerate sloverliness or slackness. He would see red if he saw staff attending office late or whiling away their time in gossips or entertainments instead of working during office hours. He would shout at them:—You are a disgrace to the concern. If you cannot work, go and beg in the streets. That surely was too much for the sensitive, emotional air lines employees and enough for them to feel insulted and to call a strike. I had to sort out the problem and nip it in the bud. He being young and himself a dedicated hard worker expected others to do the same, a touch of Nehru, JRD and their impetuousity even.

He had the highest sense of integrity and was completely incomputible. During my working with him for over three years I never noticed him yielding to pressures for out of turn promotions or even employment from any quarter. He never used his official position for personal or private benefit.

Even though himself meritorious he was against giving preference to the so called merit above seniority. "Who is to judge merit?" he would ask. "Under the cloak of merit more harm than good would be done", said he. And suprisingly even for the selection of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the country some ten years later adhered to seniority blindly rather than to merit.

He was a great believer in setting a personal example. Be it as regards punctuality or concentrating on work. He would, when not out on tours, arrive his office carrying his lunch at 08.30 AM and sit till 18.00 hrs. He would be engaged in conferences, seeing officers or staff, dictating or writing neat, clear convincing notes—or studying charts of airlines loads, pol consumption and so on.

Even for his only son, Robin— then on two months wait for Senior Cambridge results, he would advocate temporary employment

as Peon in some architect's office. So that the boy could see for himself the real life of an architect, which the boy aspired to be. And now Robin after five years training in U. S. is one of the countries top architect. Said Lal when asked whether a Peon's job was OK for a Genl. Manager's Senior Combridge son? Why not? My father after I returned from U.K. on completing a course of journalism got me appointed as a low paid clerk in the Statesman, Calcutta and in two months there I learnt more than as a Junior staff. He was very simple in his habits, a strict tea-- totaller. As an AVM and a General Manager of Airlines he would only offer best available sharbats or araqs—but no alchohol with superb Indian dishes.

He was very kind at heart even before one man tribunal (Ex-judge Bind Basri Prasad deciding air Corporation Employees Union's (ACSU) complaints versus the Airlines), he freely admitted grants totalling over thirty five lakhs of rupees. But he would not yield on principles.

He had the great good luck of having an ideal Indian wife—very highly dedicated, trained but as simple, elegant and dignified as can be. She was a great moral support to him in his career and advancement.

Verily in Lal's early demise the nation has lost an extremely knowledgeable technical Air Craft Expert, a vertitable think tank and an outstanding Indian administrator and leader of highest calibre, who proved his worth all along his service. Our Nation's victory over Pakistan in 1965, and later in 1971 was mainly due to his superb planning of Air ops—and conduct of the same respectively. And may his life inspire our youths.

Henry Treise Morshead—Macgregor Medal Recipient, 1914

BRIGADIER J A F DALAL

ON the 17th May 1931, Lt Colonel H T Morshead, D S O, R E, Director, Burma Circle, Survey of India was shot dead while out for a morning ride and the Survey of India lost a most valuable traveller, explorer and geographer.

Who was this man who could be described perfectly by the Latin phrase *mens sana in corpore sano*? Born on the 23rd November 1882 Henry Treise Morshead was the eldest son of Reginald Morshead, J P, of Hurditch Court, Tavistock, Devon, a brother of Sir Owen Morshead, Librarian at Windsor Castle, and a nephew of Frederick Morshead, a master of Winchester who was famous in mountaineering circles as one of the fastest climbers that ever set foot on the Alps. Henry went to Winchester in 1896, passed into Woolwich and was gazetted a second lieutenant in the Royal Engineers on the 21st December 1901. After a further two years' training at the school of Military Engineering at Chatham, where he was awarded the Fowke Memorial Medal given to the young officer who distinguished himself in the school of Fortification Construction, he applied for service in India and was accepted. He was first posted as Garrison Engineer, Military Works Services in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh and after about three years joined the Survey of India in 1906 as an Assistant Superintendent, 2nd Grade, in the Trigonometrical Branch Office at Dehra Dun.

After spending the first six years with the Survey of India in Dehra Dun, where he obtained all round experience, he became an expert in the history of Himalayan, and in particular, Tibetan exploration. Then followed two tough field seasons (1911 and 1912) with the Abor and Mishmi Expeditions, where he did excellent work in spite of most unfavourable weather conditions in a previously unexplored area. "Careless of personal comfort and blessed with the digestion of an ostrich, he seemed to thrive on the roughest fare, and could do with impunity things that would put most men on the sick list."

In 1913 Captain F M (Eric) Bailey of the Indian Political was looking for a companion to explore the Tsangpo Gorges. John Buchan in his book 'The Last Secrets' has stated :

"Did the Tsangpo ultimately become the Brahmaputra or did it flow into the Irrawaddy or even into the Yangtse Kiang?"

Bailey and Morshead were well matched ; "both could work long hours in almost impossible conditions and both seemed oblivious to the normal requirements for sleep and food." The expedition proved by actual exploration that the Brahmaputra and Tsangpo were the same river; it surveyed for the first time an area including many snow peaks and rivers ; and made known to the outer world several places whose importance had not been earlier realised. For his share in the expedition Morshead received the thanks of the Government of India and of the Secretary of State for Indian and was awarded the Mac Gregor Medal by the United Service Institution of India.

During the 1914-18 war, he first trained sappers for the new armies in 1914 in England and then went to France in 1915 and later commanded the Royal Engineers of the 46th Division as a T/Lt. Colonel. He had to wait ten years before he became a substantive Lt Colonel. He was wounded on the 25th September 1917, was mentioned twice in Sir Douglas Haig's despatches and was awarded the D.S.O.

On reverting to the Survey of India at the end of the War, he found himself almost immediately on active service again in command of the Survey Party with the Waziristan Field Force in early 1920. Later in the same year he joined Dr A M Kellas in an expedition to the 25,447 ft Kamet; they failed to reach the summit, mainly because the porters could not be induced to place a camp at Meade's Col (23,500 ft). But the physiological results of the expedition proved most valuable when organising the Everest Expedition next year. For a few months after returning from Kamet, Morshead held charge of a topographical survey party.

In 1921 he was placed in charge of the Survey of India detachment which was attached to the expedition sent out by the Royal Geographical Society and the Alpine Club for the reconnaissance of Mount Everest. The detachment under Morshead completed the survey of 12,000 square miles of totally unexplored mountainous terrain on the scale of 4 miles to an inch. During this reconnaissance, he climbed

Kama Changri (21,300 ft.) and the Lakhpa La (Windy Gap) 22,350 ft. without feeling any inconvenience due to the high altitude. After returning from this expedition, he held charge of a Triangulation Party for four months before going off with the Second Mount Everest Expedition. To Lt Colonel Howard-Bury's book, "Mount Everest: The Reconnaissance, 1921", he wrote an appendix on the survey work.

For the 1922 Expedition to Mount Everest he took leave to join as a climber, unfettered with surveying duties, and took part in the first assault with Mallory, Somervell and Norton. "He was with the first party to reach and camp at 25,000 ft., but the exertion of getting there, after insisting on doing more than his share of carrying and step-cutting the previous day, prevented him from continuing the climb when an altitude of 26,985 ft. was attained." Sickness and frostbite prevented him from going on with the others. He was just not properly equipped for the climb having bought his clothing and equipment from the Darjeeling Bazaar, as permission to join the expedition was received very late. He lost part of three fingers of his right hand after the second expedition. On both these expeditions his knowledge of Tibet and the Tibetan people and language proved of great service.

After a well deserved leave he was placed in charge of a topographical party in Southern Circle at Bangalore and remained there for three years till 1926. In 1924, however, the Everest Committee pressed him to take part in that year's Everest Expedition as Transport and Base Officer due to his knowledge of the Tibetan language and his sympathy with the Tibetan people and porters. This time though Morshead was ready to go at his own expense, on leave without pay, the Surveyor General intervened and said that no officers of the Department could be spared for this expedition (in which, subsequently, Mallory and Irvine lost their lives).

At the end of 1926 he could not be stopped from taking about four months leave on full pay along with nine months on half pay. He established his wife and children at Ockley (where the family still has a home), and went off to Cambridge University to join the University expedition to Edge Island, Spitzbergen. The leader of that expedition was just twenty, while Morshead nearly forty-five. This was to be his last expedition, though he never realised it at that time. On return from leave, he rejoined at Bangalore in January 1928 and proceeded shortly thereafter to attend the Senior Officers' School at Belgaum. After this

there was a posting to Dehra Dun as Officer-in-Charge of a Drawing office and finally to Maymyo as Director, Burma Circle, in May 1929. Just about two years later he was shot dead on the 17th May 1931 when out for a morning ride. The assassin was never apprehended.

Henry Treise Morshead was an outstanding surveyor, explorer and linguist. His loss was greatly felt in the Survey of India. He had an idyllic life with his wife Evie, whom he had married in 1917. Besides the widow, he left behind five children, the eldest being only about eleven in 1931. Ian, the second son, came to India in 1979 in order to find out how his "indestructible" daddy died. He then went to Burma to gather further details of his father's death. By 1982 he produced a very interesting book, "The Life and Murder of Henry Morshead." This has been separately reviewed in this copy of the Journal.

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Book Reviews

THE SAGA OF LADAKH: HEROIC BATTLES OF REZANG LA AND GURUNG HILL 1961-62

By MAJ GEN JAGJIT SINGH

Vanity Books, C-7/177A, Lawrence Road, Delhi-110035, 1983; Pages: 155; Rs. 65/-

THE Indian debacle in the wake of the Chinese invasion of 1962 was not without a relieving feature. People in India and abroad generally know about the Indian defeat in actions in NEFA (presently Arunachal Pradesh) in the fall of 1962, but not the glorious Indian defence against the invaders in the Western Sector of the Indo-Tibetan border, i.e. Ladakh. Several books have been hitherto published on the Sino-Indian Conflict of 1962, but hardly anyone of them has focussed on the heroic resistance put up by small Indian outposts in the Ladakh region. From that angle of vision, this book under review, with a beautiful Foreword by Gen K V Krishna Rao, will serve a useful purpose. It is a pity that although there is a Historical Section under the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, no official history has been published so far on the J&K Operations, 1947-48, Sino-Indian Conflict 1965, Indo-Pak War, 1965, and the Bangladesh War, 1971. Objective histories must be written on all operations, based on relevant first-hand documents, so that our soldiers and administrators can learn from past mistakes. Nobody gains anything by hiding the pretty old classified sources under the carpet. Maj-Gen. Jagjit Singh (Retd) deserves congratulations for writing this readable account of the 1962 Operations in Ladakh from his personal experience as Brigade Major of the 114 Infantry Brigade in Ladakh.

In the first four chapters of his book, the author has given the past history of Ladakh, his personal experiences, the Indian Army's defensive build-up in the region and the 'Forward Policy'. In the fifth and sixth chapters he has described the hostile actions of the Chinese at Galwan and the Chinese attack. Chapters 7 and 8 describe the new Indian Command set-up and preparations for battle. The

9th chapter gives the essence of the book—the saga of Indian bravery as displayed in the battle of Chushul. With the Chinese shelling of the Indian forward posts in Depsang plains of Ladakh, at 11 P.M. on 19th October 1962, the Sino-Indian War started in this Western Sector of the Indo-Tibetan border. One by one, 18 small Indian outposts, such as Parmodak, Bishan, Chandni, Bhujan, etc. fell fighting by 22 October. Posts Daulat Beg Oldi and Talwari, held by 125 and 10 all ranks respectively, were vacated in the face of large concentrations of Chinese troops. In the Central Sector of the Ladakh border, the Indians fought very bravely against vastly superior Chinese invaders at Galwan, suffering casualties of 30 all ranks dead and 18 others, including the Commanding Officer, Major S.S. Hasabnis, wounded, out of the total of 60 all ranks. Similar brave actions were fought at Patrol Base, Nulla Junction, Hot Springs and Sirjap I and II, in the Chushul Sector. Major Dhan Singh Thapa was awarded Param Vir Chakra for his gallant fight at Sirjap I. In the Southern Sector of the Ladakh border, small Indian contingents braved the Chinese attacks at Chang La and Jara La. In the 8-day battle, 50% of Indian defenders of the border posts were either killed, wounded or captured. The ratio of killed to wounded/captured was about 4:5, a very high ratio of killed for any battle.

During the temporary lull after 28 October, the Indians completed a quick build-up of tanks and artillery in the 4000 meters high Chushul Valley with the help of AN 12 transport aircraft. The climatic condition was very adverse, with the mercury falling down to -40° .

On 18 November 1962 the Chinese started their second series of attacks in Chushul area. The battle of Chushul was fought on the snowy heights of Rezang La and Gurung Hill, which were attacked by the Chinese with numerical superiority of over 10 to 1. But the Indians fought almost to the last man and last round. At Rezang La, Major Shaitan Singh of 13 Kumaon won PVC posthumously and his three Platoon Commanders and five ORs were awarded Vir Chakras. Four others received Sena Medals. In the bloody battle of Gurung Hill, 2/Lt S D Goswami was awarded Maha Vir Chakra, and one Vir Chakra and 2 Sena Medals were awarded to others.

In the 10th chapter, the author has discussed IAF's contribution to the war by providing transport support. In the next two chapters he has given us "A Politico-Military Analysis" and "India's Security Environment", which do not, however, strictly come within the orbit of the subject of his book. Similarly, the last Chapter of his book

"India's Defence Preparedness,, is also a digression. Nevertheless, the author has shared with us his ideas about our defence management at the highest level, which are thought-provoking. He has asked for (a) Chief of Defence Staff, (b) substitution of civilians by defence personnel in secretariat level decision making, (c) civil participation in battle zone, (d) rationalisation of para-military forces by bringing them under the control of the army, and (e) military representation in the Parliament through nomination, etc.

The book contains some operational sketch maps, photographs of men and equipment and an Index. There is no doubt that this publication will be read with great interest by military men, administrators and scholars.

—B C

**SPOTLIGHT: FREEDOM FIGHTERS OF BANGLADESH: A NEW OUTLOOK
BASED ON AUTHOR'S RESEARCH WORK**

BY CAPT S K GARG (RETD)

Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi, 1985. Pages: 208; Price Rs 70/-

THIS book has grown out of Capt S K Garg's (Retd) doctoral dissertation, based on secondary sources. It is understandable that he could not consult classified official records. He has not revealed whether he could interview some of the actual participants in this guerilla war or in the following real war, for collecting material for this book. Perhaps he has done, but he has not mentioned the name of any interviewee. Nor has he consulted useful books on the subject, so far published in Bangladesh and Pakistan, as his bibliography shows. What is more, the author has tried to cash easy credit by introducing his book, at the very outset, with a number of laudatory 'certificates' from some generous Generals.

Instead of discussing in detail the birth and growth of the freedom fighters of East Bengal, their strategy and tactics, their success and failure, and the comparative roles of the Freedom Fighters and the Indian Forces, he has given a lopsided account of political development in the Subcontinent from 1830 to 1984 in a hotch-potch manner, and that too in as many as 53 pages. Then in the next chapter-35 pages-he has dealt with the basic concepts of guerilla warfare as enunciated by Confucius ("By gaining people, Kingdom is gained; By losing people, Kingdom is lost."), Kautilya, Von Moltke, Clausewitz, Hamley, Goltz, Lenin, Lawrence, Mao Ze dong Giap, Che Guevara, Nasution, etc. But mainly, he has adopted the Maoist guerilla strategy :

(1) Enemy advances, we retreat; (2) Enemy halts, We harass ; (3) Enemy tires, we attack ; (4) Enemy retreats, we pursue; — for interpreting the guerilla war in Bangladesh. The third chapter has been devoted by the author to the political movement for the liberation of East Bengal from the colonial oppression of Pakistan, during March 1971. The real theme of the subject is found in the next two chapters—"The Mukti Bahini" and "Guerrilla War and Pakistan Warfare". The last chapter gives you "Summary and Conclusions".

However, the author has failed to interpret the true character and significance, potentiality and actual performance of the guerrilla war in Bangladesh. He has not even told us about the various categories of the Mukti Bahini. However, the author has done considerable research in a difficult field. He has shown how the Muslim peasantry was exploited in Bengal for centuries and that the Muslim peasants were not without bravery and hardihood as illustrated by the revolt of Titu Mian in 1830. In 1978, Gen Yahya Khan (Retd) admitted that erstwhile East Pakistan was always exploited by West Pakistan and that the seed of the break-up had existed right at the time of the creation of Pakistan, and the situation had deteriorated by the West Pakistani officers who were posted in "East Bengal".

Although not arranged and developed logically Capt Garg's thesis is informative. However, the book contains many glaring mistakes, e. g. Gona (should be Gano) Bahini. The book contains a useful bibliography and index, though not catalogued alphabetically. —B C

NKOMO: THE STORY OF MY LIFE

By MATHUEN

London, 1984; Pages 270; Price: 9.95, in U K Only

OUTSIDERS know very little about black Africa, and whatever they know is through the white's writings, which are obviously far from objective. Hence, this autobiography of a legendary black African, very well-written, is invaluable for understanding Zimbabwe and southern Africa at large. Often called the Father of Zimbabwe, Nkomo has told his life-story in a lucid style, how the son of a school teacher in a remote village has struggled ceaselessly for 30 years to liberate his motherland, and, even after liberation, continued to fight for Human Rights in his own country and elsewhere. When he was forced to flee to Britain by Robert Mugabe in 1983, he wrote this book before returning to Zimbabwe and continued political activism.

Nkomo's wide travels in Africa, USA, Castro's Cuba, Soviet Union and Mao's China made him understand international politics better. He has made some interesting observations: "I believe it must be their own ideological weakness that makes the Western countries so frightened of the Cuban presence in Africa. The Americans help the West Europeans and nobody is surprised by that. But if any country friendly with the Soviet Union helps someone else, that is immediately denounced as Soviet imperialism. We had the British in our country for ninety years: we learned English in our schools, and we read Shakespeare and Dickens. But that did not make us British. We remained Africans.....Africa can survive plenty more invasions, and beat them back if necessary, before it loses its identity." (p.178). The author says that he has realised now "that a nation can win freedom without its people becoming free..... The new African rulers who came to power at independence have all too often claimed the same unquestioned authority as their traditional and colonial predecessors" (pp. 245-6). In his concluding chapter, "Freedom Lies Ahead", Nkomo has prescribed measures for improving Zimbabwe's political and economic life.

The book contains many illustrations and an Index. Africa-watchers and even general readers will find this book very interesting. —B C

COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN KENYA 1952-60

BY ANTHONY CLAYTON

THIS book drives home familiar points in the handling of counter-insurgency problem. The basic requirements elucidated are those of coordinated civil and military direction, good intelligence and successful small unit operations. The book also elaborates how Parliamentary control tried to alleviate hardships on the people by constantly enquiring into any reports of excesses by the security forces. The main fact remains clear and that is the need for a realistic analysis on the causes for the insurgency situation and the consequent reaching of a political solution to the political problem which is the basis for the uprising. Except by an imperialist power therefore suppression is not the sole answer.

The book might be usefully read with other books on the subject.

—S S

WORLD REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS

BY MOSTAFA REJAI AND KAY PHILLIPS

The book might be usefully read with other books on the subject.

A review of the following books is forwarded herewith :—

- (a) World revolutionary leaders by Mostafa Rejai and Kay Phillips.
- (b) Dezinformatsia (active measures in Soviet strategy) by Richard H Shultz and Roy Godson.

The book attempts to statistically examine a set of prewar and postwar leaders of revolution. It reaches interesting conclusions about the origin and characteristics of such persons. It would appear that the qualities that they possess are those that would have served them even if they had formed part of establishment elites. The only difference being that they affiliated themselves to the service of a cause for which they saw no hope through the existing institutions. The latter were unresponsive to take the necessary actions to alleviate distress. Turning to violence when redress of grievances appears impossible in the prevalent form of Government is what preceptive political leaders must realise in time. It is only then that trouble is avoided.

The book is an interesting starter for a deeper study of the subject. There is a comprehensive bibliography attached to it. —S S

DEZINFORMATSIA (ACTIVE MEASURES IN SOVIET STRATEGY)

By RICHARD H SHULTZ AND ROY GODSON

COMMUNIST ideology preaches the constant development of struggle till the world is converted to this creed. Disinformation is a part of the active measures that are taken by a State to sap the will of an adversary. This political warfare is not new. Sun Tzu writes about this in 'The art of war' and Kautilya does the same in the 'Arthashastra'. The British were past masters at it in their expansion in Asia.

While it is easier for closed societies to block such Machievellian moves this is not the case in open societies. The book attempts to educate Americans in this respect and to divulge the Soviet organisation and methods employed in the furtherance of their policy of struggle. The existence of communist parties in all target countries simplifies Soviet penetration.

The book makes interesting reading.

—SS

MILITARY PSYCHOLOGY

By RAJ NARAIN

(Published by National Psychological Corporation, Agra 1979) VIII+252 pp, price Rs. 50/-

MILITARY Psychology is the application of the various branches of Psychology to the solutions of the problem of Military life. It also

utilises the knowledge from other disciplines like Physiology and Sociology. Raj Narain in *Military Psychology*, in eleven chapters deals with historical development, present status and future of military psychology and other problems like system approach, equipment design, senses as instruments, selection and classification, training, motivation and morale, psychology of nations, psychological warfare, stress and illness and war and peace.

The term military psychology was first used by W.V. Herbert in 1897 in the article entitled "The Psychology of the Battle field", but it was during world war I, the knowledge of psychology was applied in meeting the challenges of the soldiers leaving the battlefield for selection and classification, training and clinical diagnosis and treatment of mentally ill soldiers. During World War II, it also tackled problems like man-machine system, equipment design, morale, propaganda and psychological warfare. In India, the research in military psychology commenced in 1943 with the creation of a cell in the Defence Ministry. Regarding the future, the author hopes that military psychologists will be required to develop competence in relatively unexplored areas and the work will be more inter disciplinary.

In the area of experimental psychology and human engineering, the author lays stress on system approach and discusses problems like man-machine system, system development and analysis displays and control and layout of work space, senses and also problems like glare, camouflage, vigilance and communication.

In personnel psychology, the discussion is based on the different models of selection, steps in designing a selection programme and the selection of officers and other ranks in Army/Navy/Air Force in different countries. According to Raj Narain, one of the limitations of selection is that people change in unexpected ways, so there is a need to take into consideration, job and situational factors, besides personal factors, and also to anticipate the changes that are likely to occur at the time of selection. In 'Training' he discusses the 'Integrated Method of Training' which is an integration of combat fundamentals and team training. He also makes a mention about leadership development techniques.

In four Chapters relating to social psychology, Raj Narain feels that the main motivation to join the services is the sentiment of nationalism coupled with pay and allowances. There is a need to assess motivation at the selection stage, but it also depends upon training. Motivation changes with time and so there is a need to


undertake periodical surveys to assess motivation and morale and to have proper intervention programmes. Morale in the services also depends upon civilian morale. India has her immediate neighbours—Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, China and Russia. There is a need to know the psychology of our neighbours and studies of national character can be of help in this direction. Psychological warfare is the application of propaganda for the purpose of war: so the discussion is based on the analysis of propaganda and rumours. Due to the disastrous effects of nuclear and chemical war, the people are thinking about the alternatives of avoiding wars and peace research has caught the attention of many countries. It aims at removing obstacles to self realisation. It has to depend on humanities and philosophies for insights.

In the area of clinical psychology, the author examines the concept of psycho-physiological stress and problems of combat exhaustion, flying stresses, chronic situational stress and brain washing. Raj Narain stresses the importance of environmental factors in non-effective military behaviour, so the psychologist and psychiatrists have to pay more attention to such factors in the treatment of mentally ill soldiers. The military psychology during the course of time has accumulated a sizeable body of knowledge and techniques which has found application in the field of education, industry and clinical/abnormal setting.

In conclusion, Prof. Raj Narain deserves thanks for the efforts he has put in, in writing this book. It will be of help to both academic community and services and general reader. The reviewer wonders, if it will be possible for the author to revise and update the book in consultation with Defence Institute of Psychological Research and Services Headquarters with a view to incorporating the findings of the researches carried out by Defence Institute of Psychological Research and other organisations and other relevant information about service problems. It will enhance the utility of the book in the Indian context.

—P C B

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
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